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1Demystifying Legal Reasoning
Legal reasoning, meaning reasoning about the requirements
and application of law, has been studied for centuries.1  This is
not surprising: legal decisionmaking is tremendously important to
peace, prosperity, human dignity, and daily life.  Yet, at least
since Sir Edward Coke described the common law as “an artificial
perfection of reason,” legal reasoning has been surrounded by an
air of mystery.2  More recent works on legal reasoning have
produced neither clarity nor consensus on what legal deliberation
entails; if anything, they have compounded the problem.  Legal
decisionmaking is frequently described as a “craft” involving
special forms of reasoning that are accessible only to those with
long experience in applying law.3  Seasoned judges and lawyers
are said to reason analogically from one case to another and to
discover or construct “legal principles” that differ from the
moral principles that govern decisionmaking in other areas of
life.4
Our own contribution to the subject of legal reasoning is
fairly simple: we believe that legal reasoning is ordinary
reasoning applied to legal problems.5  Legal decisionmakers
engage in open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and
deduction from authoritative rules.  These are the same modes of
reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do.  Popular
2descriptions of additional forms of reasoning special to law are,
in our view, simply false.  Past results cannot determine the
outcomes of new disputes.  Analogical reasoning, as such, is not
possible.  Legal principles are both logically incoherent and
normatively unattractive.  Nor do legal decisionmakers engage in
special modes of interpreting texts.  To the extent that judges
purport to discern meanings in legal texts that differ from the
meanings intended by the authors of those texts, they are making 
rather than interpreting law.6
We recognize that, as a descriptive matter, legal actors
purport to apply special decisionmaking techniques.  They study
prior outcomes, seek analogies, and search for principles.  We
offer a limited defense of traditional legal methods of this
kind.  Our defense, however, is indirect, based on the capacity
of traditional methods to counteract the situational
disadvantages that affect judges as appliers of rules and as
rulemakers for future cases.  We explain these techniques as
ingrained practices that may have instrumental value for
imperfect reasoners, not as specialized forms of reasoning.
Part I describes the circumstances that give rise to law and
sets out our understanding of the most important problems of
jurisprudence.  This is familiar ground but nevertheless
important as background for our analysis of legal reasoning.  As
will be clear, we owe significant debts to others who have
3studied the subjects we address here, in particular H.L.A. Hart
and Frederick Schauer.7
Part II addresses legal reasoning in the application and
development of common law.  We have several aims in this part of
the book.  We hope to clarify the reasoning methods judges use,
to demonstrate that a variety of other supposed methods of legal
decisionmaking are illusory, and to explain the different roles 
judges occupy within the legal system, as adjudicators and as
lawmakers.  In presenting our view of what common law reasoning
entails, we face a descriptive problem: courts often insist that
they are reasoning in ways that we say they are not.  To defend
our limited view of legal reasoning and at the same explain the
apparent behavior of courts, we propose that a number of time-
honored judicial techniques function not as actual decisionmaking
tools but as indirect strategies to avoid the disadvantages that
judges face in their dual capacities as adjudicators and
lawmakers.
4Part I: Law and Its Function
Chapter One: Settlement
Moral Controversy
The need for legal reasoning comes about when members of a
community confer authority on certain individuals to settle moral
controversies.1  The controversies that concern us arise in a
community whose members agree on moral values at a fairly high
level of generality and accept these values as guides for their
own action.2  Individuals who are fundamentally like-minded and
well-intentioned may nevertheless differ about the specific
implications of moral values, or they may be uncertain about the
best ways to realize shared values.  Recognizing that
controversies of this kind are inevitable, the community can
reduce the moral costs of disagreement and uncertainty by
delegating a power of settlement to a chosen authority.
Settlement, as we use the term, is not simply choice of a
solution.  It entails reasoning, by which we mean conscious,
language-based deliberation about reasons for the choice
ultimately made.3  The members of our imagined community have not
agreed to flip a coin; they have selected a human authority to
translate the values that serve as reasons for action within the
community into solutions to practical problems.  Given the flaws
of human reasoning, the solutions the authority endorses may not
5be justified in the sense that they are morally correct.  But,
because the authority’s task is to settle what the community’s
values require in practice, its conclusions must be susceptible
to justificatory argument.  They cannot refer to intuition alone.
If the authority chosen to settle controversies could be on
the scene whenever a dispute or uncertainty arose, there would be
no need for anything more than a series of decisions about what
outcome is best in each instance, all things considered. 
Normally, however, it is neither practical nor desirable for
authorities to be constantly on hand; therefore, the community
will need a form of settlement that can guide future
decisionmaking.  The way to accomplish this broader form of
settlement is through authoritative rules.4
A rule, for this purpose, is a general prescription that
sets out the course of action individual actors should follow in
cases that fall within the predicate terms of the rule.  To
settle potential controversies effectively, the rule must
prescribe, in understandable and relatively uncontroversial
terms, a certain response to a certain range of factual
circumstances.5  It must claim to prescribe, and be taken as
prescribing, what all actors subject to the rule should do in all
cases it covers.  It must also require its subjects to respond as
prescribed without reconsidering what action would best promote
the reasons or values that lie behind the rule.  We call rules of
6this kind “serious rules,” as distinguished from advisory rules
or “rules of thumb” that purport to guide but not to dictate
action.6
For example, suppose that a rulemaking authority enacts the
rule “No one shall keep a bear in within 1000 feet of a private
residence.”7  The motivating reason for this rule may be to
protect the safety and peace of mind of the inhabitants of
residential neighborhoods.  At a deeper level, the rule may
reflect the assumptions that human interests rank higher than the
interests of bears and that the liberty of property owners to use
their property as they wish is subject to a duty not to inflict
harm on others.  In some situations, the rationale for the rule
may not apply with its ordinary force: the bear may be a gentle,
declawed former circus animal, kept in a sturdy double cage.  But
the rule makes no exceptions: its upshot is that bear owners must
keep their bears elsewhere, irrespective of the underlying
purpose of the rule.8  Rule subjects therefore need not consult
the rule’s purposes in order to determine the what the rule
requires of them.
We use the term rule in a fairly inclusive way.9  The rules
we are interested in are posited by human beings; in this
respect, they differ from non-posited moral principles.  The
rules’  prescriptions are serious in the manner we have just
described.  Aside from these characteristics, the rules we are
7concerned with may be quite general or fairly specific, so long
as they are general enough to settle some range of future cases. 
They may be posited in canonical form or implicit in material
such as judicial opinions, as long as they are traceable to human
decisionmaking and determinate enough to guide action without the
need for further assessment of the reasons that motivate them.10
Communities designate authorities to make rules because and
to the extent that they deem authoritative settlement to be
superior to individual decisionmaking.  The preference for
settlement derives from the moral costs of controversy and
uncertainty and from the ability of the chosen authorities to
design rules that further the community’s values and ends.  In
particular, settlement avoids strife; it solves coordination
problems that arise when one person’s reasons for action depend
on the actions of others; and it limits the need for costly
deliberation.11  If rulemaking authorities are wiser than most
members of the community, or have more deliberative resources at
their command, authoritative settlement is also more likely than
unconstrained reasoning to resolve controversy in morally
desirable ways.12
We emphasize that authoritative rules address the problems
of controversy and uncertainty, not the problem of misbehavior. 
In a non-ideal community, disputes may occur because particular
individuals defect from prevailing values or refuse to accept
8moral constraint.  We set aside disputes of this kind because we
wish to show that settlement is necessary even in the most
auspicious social circumstances.  In any event, when the problem
is defection from well-defined values rather than moral
uncertainty, rules are not necessary: the community can refer
directly to the values it accepts and, guided by those values
alone, punish or exact reparations from errant individuals.
Conversely, doubt and disagreement make rules essential even
when all members of the community agree on the values they wish
to pursue.  Everyone may agree that private property is morally
justified and socially valuable, that owners should have the
greatest possible freedom to use and enjoy their property that is
compatible with the interests of others, and that human safety is
of great importance, and yet differ about whether keeping a pet
bear interferes unreasonably with the enjoyment of surrounding
land.  This type of disagreement provides the motive and
justification for authoritative rules.13
In a well-developed legal system, rulemaking power will not
be confined to in a single official.  The community may designate
different rulemakers or rulemaking bodies for different domains,
and rulemakers themselves may establish secondary rules that vest
power in other sources.14  Delegation of rulemaking power from
one authority to another may also be implicit in institutional
arrangements.  For example, when a primary rulemaker designates
9others to adjudicate disputes that arise under rules, the
interpreter has power, at least presumptively, to supplement the
rules when they prove to be incomplete or indeterminate.15  The
interpreter then becomes a rulemaker in its own right.  An
implicit delegation of rulemaking authority also occurs when the
primary rulemaker chooses to promulgate a standard - that is, a
vague prescription that is likely to be indeterminate in many of
its applications - rather than a determinate rule of conduct.16 
The vagueness of standards typically stems from their use of
evaluative terms about which there is disagreement or uncertainty
and therefore a need for settlement.  Yet the standard itself,
because it uses these terms, fails to provide settlement. 
Therefore the standard functions as a delegation by the rulemaker
to actors in the first instance, and then to adjudicators called
on to apply the standard, to act as rulemakers.
Alternatively, official rulemakers may decline to issue a
prescription in any form, leaving individual actors free to
choose their own courses of action within a certain domain.  Or,
if pluralism in interpretation of values and ends appears more
important than settlement, the community may decline to confer
rulemaking authority within a domain.  Even within an unregulated
domain, however, rules may guide action as individuals formulate
general propositions to govern their own deliberations.  In
situations of this kind, individual actors act as their own
10
rulemakers.17
The Dilemma of Rules
Serious rules are necessary for effective settlement of
moral and practical controversy.  At the same time, serious rules
generate a dilemma that renders authoritative settlement a
psychological mystery, if not an impossibility.  We have
discussed this dilemma at length elsewhere; our present purposes
require only a brief summary.18
If a rule is to settle doubt and controversy, it cannot
simply track the values it is designed to promote.  Instead, it
must simplify moral and practical problems and translate disputed
concepts into concrete terms.  As a consequence, the rule will
sometimes dictate a result that differs from what its motivating
reasons require.19  The rule “No bears within 1000 feet of a
private residence” will prevent some bear lovers from rescuing
circus animals, or result in their punishment, when the bear in
question is unlikely to cause harm.
Nevertheless, from the point of view of the rulemaking
authority, as well as the community it governs, the best form of
settlement may be a per se rule: no bears.  The reason is that
unconstrained decisionmakers make mistakes.  Bear owners may make
more errors, or errors of greater magnitude, in assessing
potential harm case by case than they would make by following the
11
rule consistently.  If so, then it is rational and morally
correct for the authority to issue a serous rule and insist on
full compliance.
The dilemma of serious rules arises when one shifts to the
perspective of individuals who are governed by the rules, the
rule subjects.  Setting aside for the moment the possibility of
sanctions for disobeying the rule, if a bear owner believes that
his bear is unlikely to cause harm and needs a home, he may
believe that following the rule is not the morally correct course
of action, and it will not be rational for him to follow it.20 
Yet, if we return to the perspective of the authority, the
matter looks different because the bear owner may be wrong.  By
hypothesis, the moral and practical costs of potential mistakes
are higher than the costs of full compliance with the rule; this
is why the authority issued the rule.  Therefore, it continues to
be rational and morally correct for the authority to insist on
compliance by all owners of bears.  There is, in other words, a
gap between the rational and morally correct course of action for
the rulemaking authority (issue and enforce the rule) and the
rational and morally correct response on the part of the rule
subject (disobey).21
We do not believe this gap can be closed, at least as long
as rule subjects act rationally.  Rule subjects might adopt the
attitude Frederick Schauer calls rule-sensitive particularism,
12
taking into account the impact that failure to comply would have
on the settlement value of the rule (the value of peace,
coordination, expertise, and decisionmaking efficiency).22  Rule-
sensitive particularism is rational, and probably required as a
matter of correct reason.  But it will not close the gap between
the authority and rule subjects as long as some rule subjects may
conclude that the reasons for violating rules outweigh all the
reasons that motivate the rule, including the value of
settlement.  Indeed, rule-sensitive particularism is always
threatened with unraveling and becoming nothing more than case-
by-case all-things-considered particularism.  For in a community
of rule sensitive particularists, everyone would realize that no
one was treating rules as serious rules.  Therefore, the
settlement value of rules would be reduced, which in turn would
mean less expected compliance with rules and therefore less 
settlement value, and so on until the rules collapsed completely
as serious rules. 
Alternatively, rule subjects might resolve to follow rules
unless the action prescribed by a rule is obviously wrong in a
particular case - an attitude Schauer describes as presumptive
positivism.23  This attitude, however, is not fully rational: the
rule subject must resist acting on his or her best judgment
unless the moral mistake in the application of the rule is not
just likely, but overwhelmingly likely.24  In any event, even if
13
we assume that a limited inquiry into reasons for action is
psychologically feasible, there remains a possibility that rule
subjects will err in applying the presumption called for by this
approach.  If so, the gap persists, particularly when the primary
value of the rule lies in coordination.25
The rulemaking authority can attempt to close the gap by
providing for sanctions against those who violate rules.  In
terms of rationality, if not morality, enforcement may close the
gap between rulemakers and actors deciding whether to obey the
rules, if violators are uniformly punished, and if avoiding
punishment counts as a reason for action.26  However, a secondary
gap arises when judges are asked to impose sanctions on subjects
who have done what the judge perceives (or what the subjects
perceive) to be right in a particular situation.  In such a case,
it is morally and rationally problematic for the judge to enforce
the rules.27  Moreover, to the extent that this secondary gap
between rulemaker and judges prevents uniform punishment, the
primary gap between rulemaker and subjects recurs.28
In fact, people do follow rules.  They comply with rules
they have designed for themselves and with rules imposed by
authorities they recognize as legitimate, without reassessing
underlying reasons for action.  We suspect that the explanation
for compliance lies in habit, socialization, and an element of
self-deception.  In our present inquiry into legal reasoning, we
14
shall assume that some such combination of psychological
mechanisms allows subjects and judges to follow and enforce rules
in most cases.  Nevertheless, the dilemma of serious rules
remains in the background as we discuss deduction of legal
conclusions from rules.
The Possibility of Determinate Rules
Another important background feature of our analysis of
legal reasoning is the assumption that rules can provide
determinate answers to legal questions in a significant number of
cases.  The purpose of rules is to settle controversy about what
shared moral values and societal ends require in particular
cases.  To perform this function effectively, the rules must be
understood by most of their subjects in a similar way.  Because
the premise that rules have determinate meaning is vital to our
understanding of legal reasoning, we must briefly address rule-
skepticism.29
Critics of rule-oriented legal theory have challenged the
assumption that rules can communicate determinate instructions to
their subjects in various ways.  Some are broadly skeptical about
the capacity of law to constrain decisionmaking.30  Others
believe in the possibility of legal constraint but argue that
constraint comes not from rules but from professional norms or
specialized modes of reasoning such as reasoning by analogy.31
15
Particularly among proponents of analogical reasoning, the
claim of indeterminacy often takes the form of an assertion that
legal rules, being general, cannot determine their own
application to particular cases.32  This argument obviously runs
contrary to our own conception of rule-oriented decisionmaking,
in which the critical feature of serious rules is precisely their
capacity to dictate their application to particular cases.  It
might also seem puzzling to an ordinary rule subject, for whom
many rules appear to provide comprehensible instructions about
what to do.
What, then, does it mean to say that rules cannot determine
their own application?  One way to understand this claim of
indeterminacy is that the full extension of a rule - all cases to
which it applies - is never clear from the rule’s terms.  This is
true as far as it goes.  If a rule prohibits bear owners from
keeping their bears in “residential neighborhoods,” cases are
sure to arise involving mobile homes or hotels that may or may
not be residential and may or may not count as neighborhoods. 
Ambiguity at the margins of usage, however, is not fatal to rule-
governed legal reasoning if the meaning of the rule is clear in a
significant number of cases.  Rules will sometimes leave
important controversies unsettled.  How often this will occur is
a difficult empirical question, but common experience suggests
that indeterminacy is not pervasive.33
16
Another interpretation is that the claim that rules are
indeterminate is a general claim about language.  It may be that
in a certain technical sense, the words of a rule have no
“meaning” apart from their use in particular cases because there
are no facts in the world that correspond to the meaning of
abstract language.34  This argument is linguistically interesting
but unimportant for purposes of legal reasoning.  Whatever the
true nature of linguistic meaning, basic social understandings
allow courts and rule subjects to make sense of the language of
rules.
Assume, for example, that the governing rule prohibits the
keeping of bears “within 1000 feet of a private residence without
the owner’s consent.”  This rule contains some tricky words:
ownership is a complicated legal construct, and a full definition
of consent involves contestable moral conclusions.35   Yet, the
more typical forms of ownership are widely known, and most people
understand that in a case of disputed land use, consent normally
means express permission.  Thus, in at least some instances, and
probably in many, the words of the no-bear rule, coupled with
minimal linguistic and social expertise on the part of rule-
subjects, dictate the rule’s application.  As Frederick Schauer
puts it, among members of a community who share a language and a
sense of its “universal context,” words and their intended
meanings have “semantic autonomy.”36  (For us, if not for
17
Schauer, semantic autonomy does not imply the autonomy of words
from the author’s intended meanings - an autonomy we reject.37 
Semantic autonomy means only the autonomy of those intended
meanings from the purposes the words and their meanings are
intended to achieve.  Autonomy in this sense is enough to make
rules determinate in core cases.)
A more significant version of the claim that legal rules
cannot determine their own application is the claim that the
meaning of any rule depends on its purpose.  On this view, rules
are promulgated as means for realizing certain underlying values
and ends, and the only way to ascertain their application to
particular cases is to ask what those values and ends require in
the circumstances.38  Assuming the no-bear rule is designed to
protect the safety of surrounding residents, a bear owner, or a
court, might conclude that it should not apply to a very docile,
well-caged bear 999 feet from a single residence occupied by a
retired lion tamer.  Thus, even in a linguistically simple case,
the words of the rule do not determine whether an entry is
legally permissible.
In our view, this argument overlooks the settlement function
of serious rules.  Given the possibility That those who apply
rules will err in assessing the implications of a rule’s purposes
for individual cases, the best way to promote those purposes may
be to identify a course of action that, if universally followed,
18
will result in fewer errors overall.  In other words, the
benefits of the rule as a means of advancing purposes to
realizing certain values come precisely from its semantic
autonomy - the independence of what it prescribes from the
purposes it serves.  At best, the argument that rules are
indeterminate because their meaning in particular cases depends
on their purposes expresses a contestable view about the best way
to pursue social ends rather than a logical implication of
rules.39
Another variant of the indeterminacy argument takes a
different form but is ultimately similar in effect.  Rule
skeptics sometimes assert that rules cannot determine the
outcomes of particular cases because the application of any rule
depends on a prior classification of facts.40  For example,
Steven Burton states that at the point of application of a rule,
“[t]he connection between the abstract class and the case remains
to be drawn... Drawing this all-important connection - placing a
case in a legal class - requires a judgement of importance to
mark the particular facts that justify the classification.”41
Burton has something more in mind than the obvious truth
that the outcome of any decision depends on the decisionmaker’s
skill and integrity in finding facts.42  Rather, his claim
appears to be that the decisionmaker must judge which facts count
as important features of the case in order to determine whether
19
the case fits within the words of the rule.  But why should this
be so?  If we are correct that the words of a rule, read in light
of common social understandings about usage and context, have
semantic autonomy, it should follow that rules themselves pick
out the important features of individual cases.  Burton may be
using the term “classification” to refer to an assessment of the
relationship between specific facts and the underlying purposes
of the rule: if, and only if, certain facts are important to the
purposes of the rule, or to the overall question of what outcome
is best, they should be classified as falling within the terms of
the rule.43  If this is the argument, however, it suffers from
the same weakness as the argument from purposive interpretation
of rules: it depends on an inadequate view of the operation of
rules.
The last indeterminacy argument we address is an argument
about the body of legal rules as a whole.  Centuries of
legislative and judicial rulemaking have produced a tangled
accumulation of rules.  Even if we assume that individual rules
have a degree of semantic autonomy, the number and complexity of
existing rules, combined with a certain amount of interpretive
play, makes it likely that in a case of any difficulty two or
more different rules will point to different outcomes.  As a
consequence, legal rules do not determine the outcome of
particular cases: decisionmakers face a choice among rules, a
20
choice for which the rules themselves provide no guidance.44
This claim of indeterminacy is significant, but we do not
think it seriously threatens the possibility of governance by
rules.  As Frederick Schauer has pointed out, the extent of
overlap among rules is an empirical question.45  Moreover, rather
than simply choosing among rules that appear to conflict, judges
can and do avoid conflict by ranking and refining the rules.  . 
The very fact that legal actors try to reconcile conflicting
rules belies the suggestion that the multiplicity of rules
undermines legal constraint.46
The Nature of Law
Legal reasoning is, of course, about law.  So it might seem
that to properly address the subject of legal reasoning, we must
first specify what we mean by law.  We do not think this is the
case: nothing in our analysis of legal reasoning requires an
answer to the jurisprudential question what counts as law. 
Nevertheless, it may be useful to summarize briefly how we might
respond to that question.
In classic debates about the identity of law, the principal
divide has been between natural law and positivism.47  Those who
support the natural law position hold that because law purports
to guide action and impose obligations, the validity of any
proposition as law depends on its conformity to moral standards. 
21
Positivists, on the other hand, hold that the status of a norm as
law depends on social facts, and in particular on the fact that
the norm was posited by a source generally recognized as a
lawmaking authority.  Moral evaluation is not necessary - and, on
some versions of positivism, not permissible - in determining the
identity and content of law.  Another difference between natural
law and positivism is methodological: natural law theorists look
at law from the committed stance of insiders, who look to law for
their own practical guidance, whereas positivists look at law
from the external position of observers analyzing the practices
of those who are committed to law.48
In some ways, our understanding of the function and
operation of law fits more comfortably within a positivist theory
of law than a natural law theory.  Communities recognize
lawmaking authorities because they want the benefits of
settlement; effective settlement requires serious rules; and
serious rules, even the best serious rules possible, produce
morally defective outcomes in some cases.
At the same time, however, our view of law is linked to
morality in several ways.  We recognize that the positivist’s
route to settlement relies on insiders’ recognition of lawmaking
authority and insiders’ compliance with particular laws, both of
which are moral matters.  The settlement function that justifies
legal authorities and their posited norms - the very phenomena
22
that are the focus of positivism - is itself a moral function. 
Its aim is to reduce the moral costs of anarchy, coasts that will
occur even among those who are morally motivated.  Moreover, as
we stated at the outset, the act of settlement entails
moralreasoning: the authority’s rules, if not actually justified,
must be the product of a conscious process that is susceptible to
justificatory argument.  Only then can members of the community
view them as an exercise of the authority they have conferred,
authority to settle what the community’s values require.
 Thus, for us, positivism and natural law are complementary
rather than conflicting positions that describe two different
facets of “law.”  Indeed, a central feature of our analysis of
law is the dilemma of rules described above, a dilemma that
arises from the dual “natural law/positivist” character of law
and raises doubts about the possibility of law in the positivist
sense. 
 In this book, we approach the problem of legal reasoning
within a mainly positivist framework.  We focus on how judges
respond to posited law and how they distinguish between reasoning
from posited law and reasoning in the absence of posited law. 
Moreover, our analysis proceeds from a detached perspective of
the kind associated with positivism.
Ultimately, we argue that courts function in two ways: they
reason deductively from rules posited by others, or they posit
23
law, relying on moral and empirical judgement as any lawmaker
must.  For us, there is no middle ground in which courts discover
non-posited law in past decisions or texts, or combine morality
and posited law to construct legal principles.  At the same time,
however, we are sensitive to both the moral ends of law
(settlement and its benefits) and the dilemma that judges and
rule-subjects face when posited law appears to dictate morally
erroneous results.
24
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Postema, Classical Common Law Tradition, Part I, 2 Oxford U.
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(1981); Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61
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Reasoning: Statues, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 Vand. L.
Rev. 533 (1992)(discussing the need for “practical reason,”
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((1996)(finding support in Heidegger for learned methods of legal
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be found in Burton, supra note 1, at 25-41; Levi, supra note 1,
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Review 925, 925-29, 962-63 (1996).
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Seriously, supra note 1, at 22-31.  See also Hart & Sacks, supra
note 1, at lxxix-lxxx, 545-96 (discussing “reasoned elaboration”
of law).
5. See Kent Greenawalt, Law and Objectivity 197-202 (New York:
Oxford University Press 1992).  See also Eisenberg, supra note 1,
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Ethics in the Public Domain 310 (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New
York: Oxford University Press 1994)(application of law does not
involve special forms of logic); Frederick Schauer, Playing By
the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-
Making in Life and Law 187 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991)
(“nothing about precedent-based constraint uniquely
differentiates it from rule-based constraint”).
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of earlier writings.  See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin,
The Rule of Rules: Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas of Law 98-
179 (Durham; London: Duke University Press 2001); Larry
Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev.
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7.  See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (London; New York: Oxford
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Chapter One
1.  See Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Rule of Rules:
Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas of Law 11-15 (Durham; London:
Duke University Press 2001); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Nature of the Common Law 4-7 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press
1988) (defending an “enrichment model” of the common law); Joseph
Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain 187-92 (defending an
“institutional” approach to law) (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New
York: Oxford University Press 1994) .
2.  See Gregory S. Kavka, Why Even Morally Perfect People Would
Need Government, 12 Soc. Phil. & Pol’y 1 (1995).
3.  The nature of “reasoning” and the degree to which reasoning
guides human decisionmaking are much-debated subjects in the
field of psychology.  See, e.g., Steven A. Sloman, Two Systems of
Reasoning, in Heuristics & Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive
Judgment (Thomas Gilovick, Dale Griffin, & Daniel Kahneman, eds:
Cambridge U. Press 2002) (surveying evidence of parallel systems
of “reasoning:” associative and rule-based).
We do not intend to enter into or comment on this debate. 
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Our definition of reasoning as conscious deliberation is a
working definition sufficient to describe what we believe is
required by the notion of authoritative settlement.  Reasoning,
for us, is distinct from intuition or affective response.  The
point we wish to make is that when a community confers power on
an authority to settle moral controversy, it calls on the
authority to deliberate; to engage in an process that is at least
susceptible to explanation and justification.  Whatever the
psychology of personal moral judgment may be, a political
authority must bring its power of reason, in this sense, to bear
in decisionmaking.
For a definition of reasoning that is similar to ours
although offered from a different point of view, see Jonathan
Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 4 Psychological Review
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4.   See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 1, at 17-21.
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6.  For further discussion of the nature, function, and problems
of “serious” authoritative rules, see Alexander & Sherwin, supra
note 1, at 53-95; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 57-62
(Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press
1986); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law 16-19, 22-23, 30-33
(Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press
1979); Schauer, supra note 5, at 42-52, 77-134.
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a zoning ordinance; a private land use regulation, such as a
covenant; or a judicial ruling that a bear in a residential
setting is a nuisance per se.  Cf. Lakeshore Hills, Inc. v.
Adcox, 413 N.E.2d 548 (Ill. App. 1980) (preliminary injunction
for removal of a 575 pound pet bear based on subdivision
covenants).
8.  See Alexander & Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1191, 1192-93 (1994) (suggesting that rules
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prescribe is the right course of action in all cases to which
they apply).  
9. For a careful analysis of the variety of forms rules can take,
see Schauer, supra note 5, at 1-16.
10.  We discuss canonicity and the possibility of implicit rules
in Chapter Two, infra [33].  On canonicity as a criterion for
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matters up in detail in Chapters Five and Six, supra. 
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13.  See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 1, at 11-15.
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15.  See id. at 94-95.
29
16. On prescriptions in the form of standards, see, e.g., Cass R.
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authority, see Raz, The Authority of Law, supra note 6, at 193-
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17.  See Richard A. Fumerton, Reason and Morality: A Defense of
the Perspective 208-223, 234-39 (Ithaca, London: Cornell
University Press 1990) (discussing an act consequentialist’s need
for rules).
18.  For a full analysis of the dilemma of rules, see Alexander &
Sherwin, supra note 1, at 553-95.  Frederick Schauer makes a
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authority.”  See Schauer, supra note 5, at 128-34.
19.  See Schauer, supra note 5, at 31-34, 48-54.
20.  See Hurd, supra note 10 at 62-94; Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging
Authority, 100 Yale L.J. 1011 (1991); see also Gregory Kavka, The
Toxin Puzzle, 43 Analysis 33 (1983) and Gregory Kavka, Some
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it is impossible to form certain intentions).  The rationality of
following rules is a debated question; however, we are not
persuaded that commitment, consent, or any other mental slight of
hand can make it rational, at the time of application of a rule,
to act in a way that one believes to be wrong, all things
considered.  See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 1, at 75-77. 
For contrary suggestions, see e.g., Raz, The Morality of Freedom,
supra note 5, at 88-99; David Gauthier, Commitment and Choice: An
Essay on the Rationality of Plans, in Ethics, Rationality, and
Economic Behavior 217 (Francesco Farina, Frank Hahn, & Stefano
Vanncucci, eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford
University Press 1996); Edward F. McClennon, Pragmatic
Rationality and Rules, 26 Phil. and Pub. Aff. 210 (1997); Mark C.
Murphy, Surrender of Judgment and the Consent Theory of Political
Authority, 16 Law and Phil. 115 (1997); Scott J. Shapiro, The
Difference That Rules Make, in Analyzing Law 33, 45-54 (Brian
Bix, ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University
Press 1998). 
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(1991).  Because we believe this gap is unavoidable, we cannot
accept Joseph Raz’s suggestion that authoritative rules simply
are, as an analytical matter, exclusionary in the sense that they
preempts consideration of the reasons on which it depends.  See 
Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 1, at 75-77; Raz, The Authority
of Law, supra note 6, at 16-19, 22-23, 30-33; Raz, The Morality
of Freedom, supra note 6, at 57-62.
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Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 645, 676
n.66 (1991)(“Given that result a is indicated by rule R, you (the
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grave harm to oneself or incidental harm to others may at some
point take on a moral dimension.  See Postema, supra note 24, at
819, 822 (sanctions work by “corruption of the decisionmaking
process”).
27.  See Hurd, supra note 11, at 253-94; Heidi M. Hurd,
Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2203, 2279-
334 (1992); Rolf E. Sartorius, Individual Conduct and Social
Norms 56-57 (1975).
28.  See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 1, at 77-86.
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Kent Greenawalt, Law and Objectivity 34-89 (New York: Oxford
University Press 1992); Hart, supra note 14, at 132-44; Schauer,
supra note 5, at 53-68; Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter,
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do not determine the scope of their own applications”), 57 (“the
language of an enacted rule, announced before any case governed
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33.  See Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 36-41; Hart, supra note
14, at 132-36.
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Philosophical Investigations § 203 (G.E.M. Abscombe trans., New
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Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 781, 797-811
(1989) (relying on Wittgenstein to refute traditional
understandings of the rule of law).  For discussion of Kripke’s
argument, see Schauer, supra note 5, at 64-68; Coleman & Leiter,
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meaning of words corresponds to the best current understanding of
the things described, and the best understanding of law is a
function of the values it serves.  This argument relies
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40.  See Burton, supra note 31, at 18-20, 44, 52-57; Weinreb,
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1Part II: Common Law Reasoning: Deciding Cases When Prior Judicial
Decisions Determine the Law
We have assumed that even in an ideal community whose
members share basic values and are disposed to act on them,
settling controversies over specific applications of those values
will be a high priority.  Accordingly, the community will vest a
power of settlement in chosen authorities.  The community’s
primary lawmaking authorities, being unable to preside over every
dispute that arises, will design and enforce general, serious
rules.
In many cases, the primary authority’s rules will prove
sufficiently determinate to settle controversy without further
official involvement.  But this will not always be the case. 
Rules will require interpretation, a problem we take up in later
chapters.  Rules also will require enforcement: even if all
actors within the community are disposed to act on the same
values that animate the authorities’ rules, some may be mistaken
about what the rules require and others may believe that, in a
given case, what the rule prescribes is wrong.  Finally, the set
of rules promulgated by lawmaking authorities will not provide
answers to all questions that might arise in disputes.  For all
these reasons, the community, or the primary rulemaking
authority, will need to create adjudicative authorities - judges
with power to apply rules and settle particular disputes.
2It is possible to conceive of a legal system in which judges
performed a purely adjudicative function.  Judicial decisions
would not be publicized and, consequently, would have no
prospective effect.1  Actual legal systems, however, have not
evolved this way, perhaps as a result of community demand for
settlement.2
In the early period of English common law, for example, the
role of courts was confined almost entirely to retrospective
adjudication.3  Judges announced their views orally, and the only
written records of decisions were uninformative formal entries
and scanty collections of observers’ notes.4   Precedents were
invoked from memory and were cited, if at all, as evidence of law
rather than embodiments of law.5  The common law itself was
conceived of as an amalgam of custom and reason taken up by
judges.6  Over time, however, judicial decisions became
increasingly public, textualized, and authoritative, particularly
in the United States.7  Reports were regularized, secondary
materials sorted precedents by legal type, and judges began to
write opinions.8  Lawyers focused increasingly on the texts
representing judicial opinions, and judges as well as legal
observers came to recognize a stronger connection between past
and future decisions.9
This suggests that adjudication is unlikely to remain purely
that in a working legal system.  At the least, decisions in the
3adjudication of controversies, as well as the reasoning on which
they are based, will be known to the public.  Once publicized,
adjudicative decisions and their bases will serve not only as
examples of legal reasoning but as subjects of legal reasoning by
courts and private actors.10  The following chapters address the
nature of this reasoning.
Chapter Two: Ordinary Reason Applied to Law: Natural Reasoning
and Deduction From Rules
In our view, there are two plausible models of common law
reasoning, and only two.11  One is the “natural” model, in which
courts resolve disputes by deciding what outcome is best, all
things considered.  In the courts’ balance of reasons for
decision, prior judicial decisions are entitled to exactly the
weight they naturally command.12
The second model of common law reasoning is the “rule”
model, in which courts treat rules announced by prior courts as
serious rules of decision, then revert to natural decisonmaking
when rules provide no answers.13  The difference between these
two is that the natural model of common law reasoning treats
judicial decisions as facts about the world; the rule model
treats them as sources of law.  In the next chapter, we shall
explain why, contrary to many popular views of common-law
decisionmaking, we believe that there are no other intelligible
ways to reason from precedent. 
4The Natural Model of Common-Law Reasoning
The most obvious tools for courts to use in addressing
controversies are moral and empirical reasoning.  Moral reasoning
typically follows the method of reflective equilibrium: the
reasoner makes an initial judgment about how a particular case
should be resolved, formulates a tentative moral principle to
support her initial judgment, then tests the principle by
picturing other actual and hypothetical examples of its
application.  If the principle yields results the reasoner judges
to be wrong in test cases, the reasoner must then refine her
analysis.  She can either reject the supporting principle and
reconsider her initial judgment, hold to her initial judgment and
attempt to reformulate the principle, or, if she is convinced
that the principle as she formulated it is sound, reconsider her
judgments about its other applications.  By moving between
principles and particulars in this way, the reasoner can reach a
better understanding of both moral values and their implications
for the case at hand.14
For example: Heidi is a judge.  In the case before her,
Stephen has made plans to open a halfway house for released
prisoners in a residential neighborhood.15  Brian, who owns a
home next to the proposed site for the halfway house, has sued to
enjoin the project as a nuisance.  He argues that a halfway house
will increase traffic and bring to the neighborhood unsavory
5characters who might have a bad influence on local children. 
Stephen’s evidence shows that the halfway house will house only
non-violent criminals such as minor drug offenders and that
prisoners are more likely to make a successful transition back
into society if they spend time in a halfway house.  Stephen has
not yet invested significant resources in the project.  We
assume, as we shall assume throughout this chapter, that there
are no pertinent public regulations or private land use
agreements in the legal background of the case.
 Heidi’s initial sense of the case is that the halfway house
should be allowed to open.  The burden on landowners like Brian
is not too great, and Stephen will have difficulty finding a
suitable location if residential landowners are given a veto.  To
support this judgment, she formulates a principle: uses of land
that do not pose a significant threat to the health or safety of
surrounding owners should be permitted. 
To test her principle, Heidi considers examples of some
other activities that might be challenged as nuisances if carried
on in a residential neighborhood, examples drawn from actual
cases or from her imagination.  In her view: keeping a bear
should not be allowed; a rifle range should not be allowed; a
paintball arena should not be allowed; a mortuary should not be
allowed (ick); a day care center is reasonable; and a sewage
treatment plant is reasonable.  Heidi’s principle, allowing land
6uses that pose no significant threat to health or safety,
confirms her judgment about the bear (risky), the rifle range
(risky), the day care center (low risk), and probably the sewage
treatment plant (not much risk).  However, it does not exclude
paintball and mortuaries.  At this point, Heidi might reformulate
the principle: uses of land that pose no significant threat to
health or safety and provide a needed service to the community
should be permitted.  The added requirement of public interest
leaves open the possibility that homeowners could resist a
paintball arena and is therefore more consistent with Heidi’s
judgments about particular cases.  The mortuary remains a
problem.  Disposing of bodies might be deemed a needed service;
if so, Heidi may need to reconsider her initial response to that
case.
In any event, the issues posed by the halfway house dispute
seem clearer now than when Heidi began.  The method of reasoning
she has used, however, is not uniquely legal.  It is what any
careful reasoner does in working through a moral problem.
Some controversies requiring settlement by courts will turn
on the probable consequences of actions or the best means for
implementing agreed ends, rather than on specification of moral
principles.  In such a case, courts must engage in empirical
reasoning, gathering data and testing hypotheses.  Empirical
reasoning is probably more prominent when courts consciously
7formulate general rules for future cases than when they focus on
the resolution of a single dispute, but it can enter into
particularized decisionmaking as well, for example, when the
outcome fo a dispute depends on an assessment of risk.  The case
of the halfway house illustrates the point: to decide the
question of nuisance, Heidi must determine whether non-violent
ex-prisoners pose a substantial threat to the safety of
neighbors.16  Again, this type of assessment is not unique to
law.  There are legal procedures that may assist Heidi in
assessing the risk of violence, and some that may limit her
ability to do so, but there is nothing especially “legal” about
the method of reasoning involved.
Within a natural model of common-law decisionmaking, moral
and empirical reasoning are the only tools courts use to resolve
disputes.  This does not mean, however, that courts disregard
past judicial decisions; past decisions enter into moral and
empirical reasoning as facts about the world that can affect the
outcome of a current case.  Yet past decisions are not
authoritative in the sense that they might dictate an outcome
that is contrary to the court’s best judgment of what should be
done, all things considered.
The principal way in which prior decisions affect current
decisionmaking within a natural model of precedent is as a source
of expectations.17  Expectations can form around judicial
8decisions in several ways.  First, parties to a dispute may rely
on the finality of the court’s disposition.  For example: Claire
plans to open a day care facility in Jules’s neighborhood.  Jules
seeks an injunction on the ground that careless parents are
likely to damage surrounding lawns as they drop off their
children.  Heidi concludes that the proposed facility is not a
nuisance and denies the injunction.  Claire and Jules will expect
Heidi to reach the same result if Jules sues again, unless the
facts have changed in some important way.  As a consequence,
Claire may go forward with her day care investment and Jules may
pave over a section of grass.
Apart from the immediate parties, others may observe the
outcome of a litigated dispute and form an expectation that
courts will reach similar conclusions in the future.  Leo, who is
thinking of opening a day care facility in a neighborhood similar
to Jules’s, may calculate that future courts will not view day
care as a nuisance.  Accordingly, he is now more likely to go
forward with his plans.
Without more, a third party expectation such as Leo’s is not
necessarily a justified expectation and therefore not a reason
for decision within a natural model of the common law.  Apart
from the merits of the decision, which Leo is in no better
position to predict now than he was before Heidi decided the case
of Jules v. Claire, the reasonableness of Leo’s prediction of
9consistent treatment depends on the likelihood that courts will
in fact take his expectations into account as a reason for
decision.  In other words, his expectations are not justified
unless there is some independent reason, other than his having
formed them, for courts to protect them.
There is, however, a general social interest in facilitating
private expectations.18  Another way to put this is that there is
a social interest in coordination.  Lack of coordination among
individual actors is a common source of moral and practical
error: the best course of action for one person often depends on
the actions others take.  Yet the actions of others are difficult
to predict, especially when their choices too depend on others’
unforeseeable acts.19
In a legal system in which judicial decisions are publicly
accessible, courts can provide coordination by acting
consistently over time.  Individual actors can then predict with
some degree of confidence that others will conform their conduct
to the express or implied requirements of past decisions. 
Suppose that Sai is about to make a career decision that turns in
part on the availability of local day care in Leo’s suburb.  If
Heidi refuses to enjoin Claire’s facility in the case of Jules v.
Claire, and Sai knows that later courts are likely to give weight
to expectations of judicial consistency because of their social
importance, Sai has an additional reason to anticipate that he
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will have easy access to day care and can make a better informed
decision about his career.  Moreover, because the value of
coordination provides courts with an independent reason for
consistency with past decisions, apart from avoiding harm to the
specific individuals who formed expectations based on those
decisions, Leo’s and Sai’s expectations about the course of
future adjudication are now justified expectations.  As such,
they become moral reasons for judicial consistency in their own
right.
Another reason sometimes given for consistency with past
decisions under a natural model of common-law decisionmaking is
equal treatment: as a moral matter, similarly situated parties
should be treated alike; therefore, when two like cases arise
over time, the later court should conform its decision to the
decision of the earlier court.  Suppose, for example, that Jules
v. Claire, the day care case, is now pending before Heidi.  Jules
cites a prior case in which another judge, Rick, granted an
injunction prohibiting Ben from opening a day care facility in a
residential neighborhood.  Many would say that Rick’s prior
decision gives Heidi a reason, if not a conclusive reason, to
enjoin Claire: Ben and Claire should be treated alike.20  
Equal treatment, on this view, is a moral value in its own
right, independent from other moral principles.  If protection of
residents from traffic and noise were definitive moral reasons to
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enjoin Ben, and Claire’s facility will cause traffic and noise to
the same or a greater extent, then Claire should be enjoined as
well.  The reason for doing so, however, is not equality but
traffic and noise.  Equal treatment enters in when other moral
principles do not require Heidi to reach the same result in
Claire’s case that Rick reached in Ben’s case.  Equal treatment
is also distinct from the parties’ expectation: the argument from
equal treatment applies even when there is no suggestion that
Jules has changed his position in reliance on the outcome in
Ben’s case.
A related point is that equal treatment matters only when
the prior decision appears to have been wrong.  If Heidi believes
that Rick was correct in his judgment that the noise and traffic
generated by Ben’s day care facility amounted to a nuisance, and
if she also believes that Claire’s case and Ben’s case are alike,
equal treatment need not enter into her reasoning because
protection of residents against noise and traffic provide the
grounds for a like result.  Only if Heidi believes that Rick was
correct about Ben, and that Claire should win against Jules, does
equal treatment become a consideration. 
Although the principle “treat like cases alike” is widely
accepted as a cornerstone of fairness, we believe it has no place
in common-law reasoning about the implications of past
decisions.21  One reason is that real cases are never truly
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alike: Claire’s day care facility is sure to differ in some ways
from Ben’s.  Moreover, the only access Heidi has to the facts of
Ben’s case is the recital of facts in Rick’s opinion.  Rick’s
opinion, written with other purposes in mind, may filter out
facts that differentiate the cases in important ways.
More important, even if we assume that the past and present
parties are similarly situated in all relevant ways, we fail to
see how equal treatment of this type can count as a moral good.  
For purposes of Heidi’s reasoning, the current case can only be
viewed from Heidi’s perspective, and Heidi believes that Rick’s
prior decision enjoining a day care center was a moral error. 
One moral error is not a reason for another.  Ben may have
suffered an unjust loss in his case, but his loss is a
consequence of the prior error, not of Heidi’s decision for
Claire, and a contrary decision - to enjoin Claire - will not
make good the loss.
Let us elaborate on this point, for the argument that equal
treatment is a moral imperative can be seductive.  Equal
treatment of a certain type is a moral imperative in particular
situations.  For example, when what justice requires is solely
comparative, as some claim it to be in matters of retribution,
and still more claim it to be in matters of distribution of
resources or opportunities, then if A receives a certain
punishment or a certain distribution of benefits, and B is
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identical to A in terms of retributive or distributive desert,
then it follows that B should receive what A received in equal
measure.  The general point is banal: under any moral principle
that dictates that A and B should be treated the same, if A is
given treatment T, morality demands that B be given treatment T.
In the cases we are considering, however, the present judge
believes that in the prior case, the losing party was treated in
a way that was morally wrong.  The question before us is whether
any moral notion of equality demands that if one party is treated
wrongly, it is right to treat another party in the same way - a
way that would be wrong in the absence of the prior case.  Does
killing half of an ethnic group as an act of genocide create any
reason based on equality, however weak, to complete the task?  We
think the answer is obviously “no”: equality furnishes absolutely
no reason to extend past immoralities.
The same is true of judicial decisions: reliance aside, the
fact that judges have strayed from the standard of morally
correct treatment in the past does not alter the obligation of
present judges to apply the correct moral principle to any and
all litigants.  If, to the contrary, equal treatment were a moral
imperative requiring consistency with past decisions (including
mistaken ones), morally incorrect decisions would corrupt
morality itself.  Moreover, if the set of past cases included
both morally correct and morally incorrect decisions, the very
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notion of equality would lose coherence, with correct and
incorrect decisions pulling in different directions.
There are cases in which equal treatment may be a legitimate
consideration for judges.  If the current decision is likely to
place a prior litigant at a competitive disadvantage, avoiding
further harm may be a reason for like treatment.  If, for
example, Ben’s business will suffer if Claire is allowed to
locate in a residential neighborhood, the potential new harm to
Ben may be a (nonconclusive) reason to enjoin Claire.  But it is
Ben’s further harm, not the value of equality, that is doing the
work here.  Equal treatment may also be warranted, on grounds of
distributive justice, when the moral merits of a case are in
balance.22  If Ben’s case was essentially a coin flip on the
merits, and the same is true of Claire’s case, perhaps Ben and
Claire, who run comparable businesses, should be treated alike. 
Courts, however, do not flip coins: they generally feel obliged
to reach a conclusion as to which party has the superior right.23 
Once a court has determined that one party has a stronger claim,
that party should prevail without regard to past mistakes.
In sum: within a natural model of common-law decisionmaking,
courts engage in moral and empirical reasoning to determine what
outcome is best, all things considered.  Past decisions are
relevant to the extent that they have generated justified
expectations of consistency in the future.  For those who reject
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our views about equal treatment, past decisions are also relevant
to the extent of the weight properly accorded to equality (a
mystery we leave to believers).  Past decisions are not, however,
authoritative: the overall balance of reasons for a decision,
including expectations and (if you will) equal treatment,
determines the outcome of judicial reasoning.
The Rule Model of Common-Law Reasoning
An alternative model of common-law decisionmaking builds on
the natural model but adds one important feature: courts treat
rules announced by prior courts as authoritative in later cases
that fall within the rules’ terms.  When no rule applies, courts
continue to engage in moral and empirical reasoning to resolve
disputes.  If, however, the case is governed by a precedent rule,
courts turn instead to interpretation and deductive reasoning.24
To make clear the full implications of the rule model of the
common law, we must first return briefly to the natural model. 
Rules have a role in the process of natural reasoning.  As we
explained in Chapter One, rules capture the rulemaker’s
expertise, provide coordination for individual actors who need to
predict what others will do, and simplify the process of
decisionmaking.  For a natural reasoner, preservation of these
rule-based benefits may be a reason to conform to the rule: if
disregarding the rule would result in a loss of rule-based
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benefits, and that loss is likely to outweigh the moral costs of
following the rule, then it is right, all things considered, to
follow the rule.
For example: Heidi is presiding over a suit to enjoin Mike’s
Mortuary from opening for business in a residential neighborhood. 
Heidi discovers a prior opinion by her fellow judge, Rick,
stating that mortuaries in residential neighborhoods are
nuisances per se.25  If Heidi endorses the natural model of
decisionmaking, she will not accept the no-mortuary rule as
authoritative: the result she reaches will be based on the
balance of moral reasons for decision.  Nevertheless, the rule
may rule may affect her judgment insofar as it serves a source of
coordination or may have engendered reliance. 
 Within a natural model of reasoning, however, a rule
announced in a past case has only the weight it commands in all-
things-considered moral reasoning.  In other words, judges
approach previously announced judicial rules as rule-sensitive
particularists,26 taking into account the value of maintaining
the rule as one of many reasons for decision.  As we said in
Chapter One, however, rule-sensitive particularism is always
threatened with collapse into pure case-by-case particularism: if
all judges are rule-sensitive particularists and all judges know
this, then the value they accord to rules as rules in their
reasoning will approach zero and they will end up reasoning like
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pure particularists.  Thus, if Heidi concludes through the
process of reflective equilibrium that no plausible moral
principle supports the exclusion of mortuaries from residential
neighborhoods, and if she is not convinced that a no-mortuary
rule has significant coordination benefits, she will ignore the
rule and hold for Mike’s. 
The rule model of precedent entails a different attitude
towards rules.  In this model, prior judicial rules operate as
serious rules, preempting the question whether the reasons for
the rule justify the outcome it prescribes in a particular
case.27  If Heidi, presiding over the suit against Mike’s
Mortuary, discovers a no-mortuary rule in a prior opinion, her
inquiry into the risks, aesthetics, and social benefits of
mortuaries is finished.  Subject to certain qualifications
discussed below, she must grant an injunction.28
The rule model of common-law decisionmaking also entails a
different role for judges.  Under a rule model, rules announced
in judicial opinions acquire authoritative status.  Accordingly,
judges now function as lawmakers as well as adjudicators. 
Traditionally, common-law judges were reluctant to assume
lawmaking authority: their task, as they saw it, was not to make
law but to find it embedded in social and legal practice and the
dictates of reason.29  Modern judges, however, are more
forthright in their exercise of lawmaking power.30  The rule
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model assumes that judges have such a power.
Comparing the Models
In a world in which all judges were perfect reasoners, the
natural model of the common law would undoubtably be superior to
the rule model.  The natural model seeks the best outcome in
every case.  The rule model, in contrast, guarantees that some
outcomes will be wrong.
The errors of the rule model of common law have several
sources.  First, the rule model incorporates the basic problem of
rules: rules must be stated in terms that are general and
determinate enough to guide future conduct and decisions;
therefore they do not perfectly capture the less determinate
values they are designed to promote.  It follows that in some of
the cases they cover, they will prescribe the wrong result.31
A second source of error is bad rules.  Rules prevent error
by translating the expertise of the rulemaker into prescriptions
for action, by facilitating coordination, and by reducing the
costs of decisionmaking; but they also cause error by prescribing
wrong outcomes, through bluntness or otherwise.32  They are
justified only when, judged by the values on which they are
based, they will prevent more error than they cause.33  Some
rules fail to meet this standard, either because they were poorly
conceived from the outset or because circumstances have changed
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since they were issued.
For several reasons, judicial rules are particularly likely
to lack justification or to lose their justification over time.  
Judges are not necessarily expert rulemakers, and, as we shall
explain more fully in later sections, the task of resolving a
particular dispute may further hinder their ability to craft
sound rules.34  Another problem is that once judicial rules are
recognized as authoritative, they are hard to eliminate.  Judges
traditionally have been reluctant to overrule established rules
of law, and in any event it is difficult to formulate a standard
for overruling that does not jeopardize the benefits of
authoritative rules.35
Despite the inescapable flaws of serious judicial rules, the
rule model of common-law decisionmaking has advantages that we
believe justify courts in adopting it.  In the world as it
exists, judges are not perfect reasoners: judges operating under
the natural model of decisionmaking will seek to reach the best
decision, all things considered, but they will not always
succeed.  The important comparison, in other words, is not
between full implementation of values and flawed implementation
of values, but between the flaws of unconstrained reasoning and
the flaws of rules.  The rule model is preferable if there is
reason to think that a greater sum of moral errors will occur if
judges always decide what is best all-things-considered than if
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they treat previously announced judicial rules as serious rules
of decision.
As we have said, the capacity of rules to prevent error
depends primarily on the expertise of rulemakers and the
coordination value of the rules.  In the context of the common
law, the maker of rules are judges in past cases.  Comparing past
judges to present judges, rulemaker expertise does not go far to
make the case for a rule model of the common law.  In the case of
Mike’s Mortuary, for example, we can assume that Rick, who
announced the rule that mortuaries in residential neighborhoods
are nuisances per se, has no greater capacity for moral and
empirical reasoning about property rights than Heidi, the current
judge.  Moreover, the salient image in Rick’s mind at the time of
his decision probably was the mortuary at issue in his case,
which may not have been representative of mortuaries generally.36 
Therefore, rather than representing special expertise, the no-
mortuary rule may be myopic.
Some judicial rules stand on better epistemic ground than
others.  If the mortuary rule has been followed over time by a
multitude of judges, it may be entitled to greater respect as a
reflection of collective judgment.37  A further consideration is
that judicial rules have a wider audience than future judges.  In
comparison to private judgment, a judicial rule may sometimes
have the advantage.  In the mortuary case, Rick has studied
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evidence and heard opposing arguments by advocates about the
risks, burdens, and benefits associated with mortuaries in
residential neighborhoods.  Private decisionmakers, in contrast,
may have less information at their command, and their judgment
may be distorted by self-interest.  On the other hand, in some
settings private actors will have the best information about
their own activities, so the argument from expertise remains
weak.38
A much stronger argument is that judicial rules, when
treated as serious rules, provide a new source of coordination. 
The coordination effect may be easier to see if we alter the
mortuary example in the following way: in the precedent case,
Rick announces a rule that mortuaries are permissible in
residential neighborhoods as long as they pass municipal safety
inspections.  If this rule is authoritative for future judges,
mortuary entrepreneurs can make plans to locate in suburbs
without the worry that surrounding landowners will sue to prevent
them from opening.  If Heidi is free to decide in the next case
what outcome is best, all things considered, these entrepreneurs
are less able to predict how landowners will respond.  Because
lack of coordination results in decisional error, the community
has reason to favor judicial creation of authoritative legal
rules.  Serious judicial rules also can simplify decisionmaking,
both by future judges and by potential disputants, who must guess
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the course of judicial decisionmaking and settle or litigate
accordingly.39
Thus, the rule model of common law offers at least some of
the benefits of rules generally.  It creates a new set of
rulemaking authorities (judges) who, while they may lack special
expertise, can increase the level of coordination within the
community.  Mortuary owners will know where they can and cannot
build.  Homeowners will know whether mortuaries can build near
their homes.  Judges need not revisit the morality of mortuary
nuisance.
We have noted that the natural model of common law
decisionmaking also takes account of judicial rules.  Within the
natural model, judges can, and, as a matter of sound moral
reasoning, must, take account of the value of consistently
applied rules as a reason to follow rules announced in prior
cases.  But because natural reasoners approach rules as rule-
sensitive particularists, most if not all of the benefits of
rules will be lost under the natural model of decisionmaking.
To see why, suppose first that the no-mortuary rule appears
to reflect collective wisdom (a form of expertise).  Many judges
have held over time that mortuaries in residential neighborhoods
are nuisances per se.  Heidi endorses the natural model of
decisionmaking and acts as a rule-sensitive particularist.  She
recognizes that the rule bears indicia of expertise, but she also
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understands general rules are by nature overinclusive, and she
believes that Mike’s Mortuary is a particularly well-run and
tasteful establishment.   She may reason that even if past judges
were well-informed about mortuaries generally, the balance of
reasons underlying the rule does not apply to Mike’s. 
Accordingly, she may refuse to issue an injunction.  This is all
very well if Heidi is correct, but she may be wrong.  And if
judges in Heidi’s situation (or private parties predicting what
judges will do in Heidi’s situation) are wrong more often than
they are correct in second-guessing the rule, the community would
be better off if all judges treated the rule as a serious rule.
More important for our purposes, rule-sensitive
particularism runs into serious difficulties in accounting for
the coordination benefits of rules.  Suppose again that Heidi
follows the natural model of decisionmaking.  She understands
that Rick’s no-mortuary rule has the capacity to coordinate the
conduct of landowners and prospective morticians.  She also
believes that the rule should not apply to Mike’s Mortuary
because Mikes is tasteful and well-run.  The question she must
ask in the course of all-things-considered reasoning is whether a
decision for Mike’s, contrary to the rule, will cause a reduction
in the overall coordination benefits of the rule such that the
loss of coordination outweighs the moral gain from (what she
believes is) a correct understanding of liberty and property
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rights as applied to Mike’s.
One difficulty is that the loss of coordination from any
single departure from the rule may seem negligible.  But the
problem is more serious.  The coordination benefits of a judicial
rule depend on its consistent application in the courts: only
then can actors assume that future judges (and other actors) will
follow the rule.  In a legal system dominated by the natural
model of judicial reasoning, Heidi will expect most other judges
to approach judicial rules as rule-sensitive particularists. 
Rather than simply following the no-mortuary rule, they will ask
whether all relevant considerations, including maintenance of the
coordination benefits of the rule, recommend enjoining a
particular mortuary from opening in a particular neighborhood. 
Some will conclude that they should not grant an injunction; and,
given the inevitability of reasoning errors, some who reach this
conclusion will be wrong.  The prospect that other rule-sensitive
particularists will not follow the rule reduces the rule’s
capacity to coordinate conduct, and therefore reduces the weight
that Heidi, as well as other rule-sensitive particularist judges,
will allocate to the coordination value of the rule in their
calculations of what decision is best.  In other words, if judges
cannot predict confidently that the rule will be widely followed,
no judge will calculate that his or her departure from the rule
will damage an otherwise effective source of coordination.  In
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this way, rule-sensitive particularism as a universal practice
unravels into pure particularism stripped of serious rules and
their benefits.40
The situation changes if some judges treat precedent rules
as serious rules.  If some judges give preemptive effect to
rules, but would cease to do so if they observed rule-sensitive
particularist judges disregarding the rule, then the potential
coordination value of the rule gives rule-sensitive
particularists a reason to follow the rule.  But even when
judicial response is divided - some following the rule model and
some acting as natural reasoners - the coordination value of
rules is unstable at best.  Only a widely accepted rule model of
common-law decisionmaking preserves the full potential of
precedent rules to provide coordination.
A further problem is that, to the extent that precedent
rules retain some capacity to coordinate conduct, judges acting
as natural reasoners may fail to give coordination its due weight
in the balance of reasons for decision.  The difficulty is
cognitive: psychological research suggests that decisionmakers
tend to focus on facts that are especially salient, and in doing
so, tend to disregard or undervalue background probabilities. 
This bias, which Kahneman and Tversky have called the
“availability heuristic,” is one of a number of cognitive biases
that facilitate decisionmaking but also distort human reasoning
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in systematic ways.41  Tangible facts move quickly to the front
of one’s mind, while statistical regularities remain obscure; as
a result, the more readily available features of a problem claim
disproportionate attention.  
In legal disputes, the most salient facts are likely to be
the circumstances of the litigants before the court.  In the
mortuary case, Heidi’s attention will naturally be drawn to the
character of the plaintiffs’ neighborhood, the emotional impact a
mortuary is likely to have on the plaintiffs,42 and the specifics
of Mike’s proposed mortuary.  Meanwhile, the availability
heuristic predicts that Heidi’s interest will not be similarly
engaged by the possibility that departing from the rule might
undermine potential coordination benefits for mortuaries and
homeowners making plans in other neighborhoods.
Thus, even if the actual coordination value of a rule is not
entirely eroded by the prospect that some judges will not follow
the rule, judges may systematically underemphasize coordination
value in their calculation of what is best all-things-considered. 
The rule model of judicial decisionmaking prevents this form of
error by preempting all-things-considered analysis.  I this way,
it both preserves the actual coordination value of the rule and
builds in protection against judicial miscalculation of that
value.
A further point of comparison between the rule model of
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judicial decisionmaking and the natural model is the complexity
of the decisionmaking process.  The rule model requires
interpretation of rules, but once the court has determined that a
precedent rule covers the case before it, all that remains is to
follow the prescription of the rule.  Under the natural model, in
contrast, the existence of a precedent rule complicates rather
than simplifies decisionmaking.  A rule-sensitive particularist
judge must make at least a quick assessment of the rule’s meaning
to determine whether it is likely to apply, and then must
determine what weight the possible benefits of maintaining the
rule should have in the balance of reasons for decision.
A definitive comparison of the two models of judicial
decisionmaking we have discussed - the rule model and the natural
model - would require empirical knowledge that we do not have. 
The critical question is whether the rule model ultimately
results in less decisional error than the natural model.  The
answer depends on, among other things, the number and magnitude
of likely reasoning errors by judges, the social value of various
benefits of rules that might be lost under a natural model of
reasoning, and the number and magnitude of errors that result
from compliance with a contingent set of overinclusive rules -
matters that are extremely difficult to quantify or compare.  We
are inclined to think that, given the frequency of human error
and the demand for settlement we observe in society, the rule
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model is the better choice.  In any event, it is at least
possible, as a matter of logic, that deduction from imperfect
serious rules will produce better results overall than all-
things-considered evaluation of what decision is best.
Although there are reasons to think that judges can do
better by following precedent rules than by natural reasoning,
there are difficulties with the rule model of decisionmaking. 
Most prominently, the rule model confers a broad rulemaking
authority on judges; but judges.  We have already noted that,
because judges’ first task is to resolve particular disputes,
they are not ideally positioned to design sound rules.  Later in
this chapter, we discuss possible qualifications to the rule
model that impose some restraint on judicial lawmaking and also
provide judges with a means of escape from precedent rules that
are seriously flawed.
Another set of difficulties is descriptive: judges purport
to, and are widely believed to, act in ways that are not
consistent with the rule model of decisionmaking.  As rulemakers,
they decline to exercise the full range of legislative power the
rule model makes available to them.  As rule appliers they
“distinguish” seemingly applicable rules based on factual
differences among cases.  In Chapter Four, we shall return to the
rule model and consider whether these features of judicial
practice can be explained as strategies to counteract the
29
disadvantages of rulemaking in the context of adjudication.
This brings us back to the point with which we began the
present chapter: despite appearances to the contrary, we believe
that the two models of decisionmaking we have described - the
natural model and the rule model - are the only plausible models
judicial reasoning.  Moreover, neither of these models entails
special “legal” forms of reasoning.  Both rely on methods of
reasoning used by all decisionmakers:   moral reasoning,
empirical reasoning, and, in the case of the rule model,
deduction from authoritative rules.   In our view, these are all
the tools that judges need, and all the tools they use in fact. 
A Closer Look at The Rule Model: Implications and Puzzles
We have suggested that, at least under some conditions,
judges can best implement the shared values of a community by
treating rules announced by past judges as serious rules that
determine the results of present cases.  A central premise of the
rule model of judicial decisionmaking is that judges act as
rulemakers: judges have authority not only to resolve disputes
but also to issue binding general rules to govern future
disputes.  The assumption that judges have power to establish
legal rules leads to a number of further questions about the
scope of judicial rulemaking authority and the nature of judicial
rules.  We do not claim to have a complete set of answers; our
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objective in the following sections is simply to identify some of
the puzzles judges might face in implementing a rule model of the
common law. 
Promulgation of Rules.  The first question that arises under
a rule model of the common law is, when should judges announce
rules?  Legislatures issue rules in response to social problems
that come to their attention in a variety of ways.  Their rules
typically are prospective and designed to deal as comprehensively
as possible with the problems they have taken up.43  Judges
traditionally have taken a different approach, issuing rules in
response to particular disputes brought before them by litigants. 
Judicial rules typically provide an answer to the dispute before
the court and do not stray far beyond what is necessary to
resolve that dispute.44
Nothing in the rule model of judicial decisionmaking
dictates that courts must adhere to this pattern of narrowly
conceived, retrospective rules.  The rule model treats precedent
rules as serious rules.  Yet, because rules are general in
nature, precedent rules will always extend beyond the exigencies
of the cases in which they are announced.45  It follows that the
rule model confers plenary legislative power on judges.46  There
may be constitutional limits on judicial lawmaking, as well as
pragmatic reasons for judges to abstain from exercising plenary
power,47 but there are no inherent constraints on judicial
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authority to make rules.
Suppose, for example, that Heidi is deciding the case of
Edward, who is keeping a pet bear in his home.  Neighboring
homeowners claim the bear is a nuisance and have requested an
injunction requiring Edward to remove it from the neighborhood. 
After moral reflection, Heidi reaches three conclusions.  First,
bears typically should not be permitted in residential
neighborhoods.  Second, the possibility of reasoning errors and
the need for clarity, coordination, and decisionmaking simplicity
justify a serious rule: “bears in residential neighborhoods are
nuisances per se.”  Third, Edward’s bear, which is small,
friendly, and declawed and has spent its life in captivity, poses
no significant threat to neighbors; therefore Edward should be
allowed to keep his pet.
In the circumstances, Heidi has at least three options.  She
can decide for Edward and decline to announce a rule.  She can
announce the optimal rule (“bears are nuisances per se”) and
apply it retrospectively to Edward.  Or she can decide for Edward
and announce the rule “bears are nuisances per se” as a rule to
govern future cases.
The rational choice, and, if Heidi’s reasoning is morally
sound, the morally optimal choice, is the third of these: decide
for Edward and announce a prospective rule.  In this way, Heidi
can secure both a correct outcome for Edward and maximum
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settlement value for the future.  If we assume, as the rule model
assumes, that judges have authority to settle moral controversy
by announcing serious rules, their authority appears to encompass
this alternative.  Those familiar with judicial practice in the
United States, however, are likely to find this resolution of the
case surprising and possibly unsettling.48
Now suppose we carry the example further.  In the course of
her deliberation in Edward’s case, Heidi reflects on the problem
of noise in residential neighborhoods.  This reflection leads her
to a fourth conclusion, that the community would be better off if
all residential homeowners mowed their lawns between two and four
o’clock on Saturday afternoons.  The coordination benefits of
such a rule, she concludes, outweigh possible inconveniences to
owners who prefer a different time.  We expect that most people
would find it unseemly, as well as contrary to the ideals of due
process and democratic representation, for Heidi to issue a rule,
“homeowners must mow between two and four o’clock on Saturday
afternoons.”49  Yet once we recognize that judges have rulemaking
authority, the logic of authority places no limit on her power to
issue the rule.   To the extent that judges refrain from issuing
rules of this kind, the disability is self-imposed.
Identification of Precedent Rules.  Another question about
the rule model of the common law arises from the perspective of
later judges: what acts and statements by past courts count as
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binding precedent rules?  Legislative rules may require
interpretation, but identifying the rule is not a problem. 
Because courts traditionally have been reluctant to legislate
overtly, their rules can be harder to recognize.  Judicial
opinions typically focus on the immediate task before the court -
resolution of a particular case.  They are likely to contain a
narrative description of the facts of the dispute, references to
precedent cases, and a more or less complete explanation of the
court’s reasoning, but they may not explicitly announce a rule
for future cases.50
Several necessary conditions for the existence of a serious
precedent rule follow from our understanding of the function of 
authoritative rules.  As we explained in Chapter One, communities
recognize rulemaking authorities for the purpose of settling
controversy and uncertainty about the application of shared moral
values.51  To perform the function of settlement, rules must be
general enough to prescribe results in classes of future cases,
determinate enough to provide answers without direct
consideration of the values the rules are designed to serve, and
“serious” in the sense that they preempt further reasoning and
determine results.52
The settlement function of rules also dictates that
precedent rules must be posited by a rulemaking authority - in
this case a prior judge.53  Authoritative rulemaking is an
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intentional act.  The task of the rulemaker is to determine the
best prescription for future cases that can be captured in the
form a rule.  Rulemaking authorities, including judges, are
expected to bring their powers of reason and expertise to bear on
the choice of rules.  It follows, for us, that authoritative
rules take their meaning from their author’s intent.  We will
have more to say about intent-based interpretation of rules in
Chapter Five.  For now, the important point is that precedent
rules come into existence when they are posited by a past judge
and mean what that judge intends them to mean.54
The requirement that precedent rules must be posited does
not necessarily mean that they must appear in canonical form in a
prior opinion.  Often a rule is detectable in explanatory remarks
and citations even if the precedent court did not state the rule
explicitly and flag it as a prescription for future cases.  As
long as the judge had a rule in mind and the rule is capable of
restatement in determinate, canonical form, positing can occur in
an informal way.55  Recognition of informal rules expands the
capacity of the common law to settle future controversy: given
prevailing patterns of judicial opinion-writing, insistence on
explict rules would result in too few rules and too little
settlement.
Thus, it is possible, and probably desirable, to include
implicit precedent rules within the rule model of the common law. 
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At the same time, it is important to maintain a distinction
between rules implicitly posited by prior courts and norms
abduced by later courts from the data of past decisions.  A
precedent rule exists only when the precedent judge intended to
adopt or endorse a rule and the rule can be stated in a form that
is capable of governing future disputes.  If these conditions are
met, the precedent court can fairly be viewed as the author of
the rule.  If, however, the conditions we have described are not
present, the current judge is not following a precedent rule. 
The current judge is either constructing a norm from the facts
and outcomes of prior cases or simply positing a new rule.  As we
shall explain in our discussion of legal principles in Chapter
Three, a norm constructed from past facts and outcomes is not
posited (either by the past judge or by the current judge); nor
does it constrain the current judge’s decision in any meaningful
way.56
For example: Heidi is presiding over the case of John, who
is planning to open a music store in a residential neighborhood. 
Neighboring homeowners have asked Heidi to enjoin John from
opening his store, arguing that the noise it will generate makes
it a nuisance.57  Heidi discovers a prior decision in which a
court held an aerobics studio to be a nuisance in a residential
neighborhood.  The opinion in that case referred to the
likelihood of noise and explained that an aerobics studio would
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place too great a burden on surrounding owners.  It also cited
cases from other jurisdictions holding that a trumpet academy, an
amusement park, and an ice cream truck were nuisances in
residential neighborhoods but a chess tournament was not.  Heidi
can infer from this opinion that the precedent judge established
applied a rule, “noisy activities are not permitted in
residential neighborhoods.”
Suppose, however, that instead of the opinion just
described, Heidi finds an array of past cases holding that an
aerobics studio, a trumpet academy, an amusement park, and an ice
cream truck were nuisances in residential neighborhoods but a
chess tournament was not.  In each case, the court stated only
that the activity in question placed an unreasonable burden on
surrounding owners.   In this version of the example, Heidi has
no basis for inferring a rule against noisy activities in
residential neighborhoods.  She can posit a serious rule to this
effect, or construct a principle that appears to fit the pattern
of prior decisions, but there is no precedent rule in place to
prescribe the decision she should reach in John’s case.
Precedent rules must be posited, general, determinate, and
preemptive: this much is implied by the concept of authoritative
rules.  The rule model of common law, in itself, places no
further limits on what should count as a precedent rule.  As we
have noted, however, judges, as adjudicators, are not ideally
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situated to make rules.  To counteract the risk of flawed
precedent rules, they might adopt additional preconditions for
recognition of binding precedent rules.58 
One possible way to protect against misconceived rules would
be to deny precedential effect to rules that appear to have been
posited without serious deliberation.  The procedural history of
a decision might reveal that the court announced a rule and
intended it to operate as a rule in future cases, but that the
parties never engaged in full debate about the future
consequences of the rule.59  If so, later courts could disregard
the rule.
A requirement of adequate deliberation might not be
practical, however, at least in the context of current legal
practice.  Evidence of deliberation, such as judicial notes and
records of oral argument, tends to be scant and difficult to
obtain.  Further, regular inquiry into the deliberations leading
up to adoption of rules might undermine the prescriptive effect
of precedent rules.  Following a rule against one’s best judgment
is not rational; therefore a legal system that relies on serious
precedent rules to settle controversy necessarily depends a
general disposition among judges to follow precedent rules
without much reflection.60  Intensive scrutiny of the
deliberations of past judicial rulemakers could undermine the
practice of unreflective rule-following.
38
A second possible check on undesirable judicial rules is a 
precondition of acceptance over time.  According to this
condition, precedent rules would become binding when, but only
when, they had been “taken up” by a sufficient number of
judges.61  A condition of acceptance over time limits the
precedential effect of judicial rules to rules that have been
studied and approved by multiple judges working in a variety of
contexts: rules come to represent a kind of collective wisdom.62
One difficulty with a precondition of acceptance over time
is indeterminacy.  There is no non-arbitrary point at which a
rule has been sufficiently “taken up” by subsequent courts, and 
quantifying the extent of acceptance required would be
impractical.  The indeterminacy of acceptance, however, is like
the indeterminacy of baldness and heaps: there comes a point at
which one knows it has occurred.63
A more difficult question analytically is what exactly must
be accepted.  The intended meaning of a rule may change as judges
apply the rule over time.  For example: a prior opinion contains
the rule “domestic household animals are permissible in
residential neighborhoods.”  The judge who announced the rule
intended the term “household animals” to include horses and
chickens.  Subsequent courts have continued to apply the rule. 
Recently, however, courts applying the rule have used the term
“household animals” in a more restrictive way, to mean pets such
39
as dogs and cats.  As we have explained, one implication of the
settlement function of rules is that the meaning of rules is a
function of their authors’ intent.  This raises the question, if
precedent rules are not binding until taken up by later judges,
who is the author whose intent governs the meaning of the rule?
The authority of the original judge is incomplete because
that judge alone cannot establish a binding precede rule: the
endorsement of subsequent judges is necessary to place the rule
in force.  This suggests that the subsequent judges who accept a
precedent rule are its authors.  However, the meaning intended by
subsequent judges cannot be the meaning of the rule because that
meaning has not yet been accepted over time.  Nor, for that
matter, can the original judge’s intended meaning be the meaning
of the rule, because that meaning has not met the test of
acceptance.  It appears, therefore, that no effective precedent
rule exists until a further round of acceptance occurs, with all
endorsers concurring in the meaning of the rule as posited by
some prior judge.  This further requirement, of course, adds
greatly to the indeterminacy of the rule, and so is at odds with
the objective of settlement that motivates the rule model of the
common law.
The Persistence of Precedent Rules.  A third question that
arises under the rule model is whether and how later courts can
overrule precedent rules.  An initial point is that altering a
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precedent in any way overrules the rule.  Serious precedent rules
are effective as a means of coordinating conduct and otherwise
reducing error because, and to the extent that, later judges
follow them automatically without looking behind the rules to see
if their underlying reasons require a different result.  It
follows that when a current judge “narrows” a rule by carving out
an exception for a particular case in which the rule’s
prescription appears to be a mistake, the judge is not applying a
modified version of the rule but disregarding the rule and
establishing a new rule in its place.  As we shall explain more
fully in Chapter Three, the original rule places no constraint at
all on the current judge; in effect, the rule is overruled.64
Some power to overrule precedent rules is essential to the
success of the rule model of judicial decisionmaking.  The most
persuasive criticism of the rule model is that serious rules
entrench error.65  Rules may be poorly designed or may become
obsolete, and, as we have noted, judicial rules are especially
susceptible to flaws.  Without some qualification, the rule model
appears to require that judges follow all rules according to
their terms, and so to lock in past errors.  
Perpetual entrenchment of flawed rules, however, is not a
necessary implication of serious precedent rules.  Under the rule
model, precedent rules are preemptive in the sense that judges,
in their role as adjudicators, must follow previously announced
41
rules even if the reasons behind the rules appear to require a
different outcome in the case before the court.  Yet the rule
model also gives judges rulemaking authority, and in their role
as rulemakers, judges can override rules they believe are
flawed.66
Overruling of precedent rules is appropriate in two
circumstances, and only two.  First, a precedent rule may not be
justified as a rule, either because it was misconceived or
because it has become obsolete.  Rules lack justification if they
cause more error by prescribing erroneous outcomes than they
prevent by coordinating conduct and averting the errors of
natural reasoning.  Second, a precedent rule may be justified in
that it improves on unconstrained decisionmaking, but not
optimal: a rule may prevent more error than it causes, but
prevent less error, or cause more error, than an alternative
rule.  In that case, overruling is appropriate if but only if the
benefits of the alternative rule are greater than the costs of
disrupting the patterns of coordination that have formed around
the existing rule.  At least in theory, judges have the same
power as legislatures to repeal rules when either of these
conditions obtains.  In contrast, overruling is not appropriate
simply because the precedent rule prescribes erroneous outcomes
in some cases.  Errors of this kind are an inevitable feature of
determinate general rules.  If the rule is justified in the sense
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that brings about a net reduction in error, and preferable to any
alternative rule, the rule model requires judges to follow the
rule even when it prescribes the wrong result.
Suppose for example, that Heidi is presiding over the case
of Martha, who keeps a pet pit bull in her home.  Heidi discovers
a precedent case in which the judge announced a rule, “pit bulls
in residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”  If this rule
is sound as applied to most pit bulls and superior to any
alternatives, Heidi must apply it to Martha’s pit bull even if
she is convinced that Martha’s pet is gentle, well-behaved, and
unlikely to do harm.  If, however, Heidi believes that the rule
“pit bulls are nuisances per se” is based on faulty empirical
reasoning by a prior judge whose attention was focused on a rare
case of mauling, she can overrule the rule by announcing a
modified rule or simply declaring that no rule shall apply.
Logically, under a rule model of the common law, the powers
of judges and legislators to make and then unmake rules are
coextensive.  Traditionally, however, judges have been reluctant
to overrule precedent rules, at least overtly.67  For several
reasons, this may be a wise course.  The first is that judges
have more opportunities to overrule rules than legislatures: they
are likely to revisit rules frequently as parties bring disputes
one by one before multiple courts.  Their assessment of rules
will sometimes be incorrect, and even when their assessment is
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correct, frequent overruling will undermine the settlement
benefits of common law rules generally.
A second reason for caution in overruling precedent rules is
that judges, unlike legislators, combine their oversight of rules
with the task of adjudication.  The separate standards we have
outlined for applying sound rules and overruling unsound rules
place judges in a difficult position psychologically.  When a
precedent rule is justified overall - when it will prevent more
error than it produces if it is regularly applied - the rule
model of decisionmaking calls for judges to follow the rule
without consulting the reasons behind the rule.  Yet, judges must
consider the same set of reasons to determine whether to
overrule.  If, judged by those reasons, the rule will cause more
error than it prevents, the rule is unjustified and should be
overruled.  If, judged by its underlying reasons, the precedent
rule will cause more error or prevent less error than an
alternative rule, and the benefits of a change outweigh the costs
of disruption, the rule is suboptimal and again should be
overruled.  The problem is that, if the reasons underlying the
rule are available to judges for the purpose of overruling, they
will be hard to suppress for the purpose of application.
Assume, for example, that the rule that pit bulls are
nuisances per se is based on a balance between the welfare that
owners derive from their dogs and the risk of injury to others. 
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Heidi cannot decide for Martha on the ground that these reasons
do not support an injunction in the case of Martha’s dog;
however, she is free to decide that they do not support a rule
against pit bulls.  Locally, these two conclusions are distinct:
one concerns the outcome of the case and the other concerns the
overall performance of the rule.  In practice, however, it will
be difficult for Heidi to compartmentalize in this way,
particularly when she is convinced that an injunction is the
wrong outcome for Martha.
Perhaps this dilemma could be avoided or at least minimized
by a serious rule governing the occasions for overruling.  For
example, a court or legislature might posit a rule such as
“overrule precedent rules that have not been followed for 30
years,” or “overrule precedent rules that have been questioned by
later judges in ten or more cases.”  A rule of this kind,
however, suffers from several difficulties.  It is uncomfortably
blunt because the subject matter of legal rules and the frequency
of litigation in different areas of law varies greatly. 
Moreover, the underlying assumption that judges have power to
overrule rules creates a problem of regress.  The overruling rule
(and any higher order overruling rule for overruling rules) can
be overruled.  Ultimately, therefore, the question when to
overrule can only be resolved through moral judgment.
Given the limitations and dilemmas we have described, the
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best approach to overruling probably is a presumptive one.  No
overruling will lead to too much bad law.  Overruling whenever a
precedent rule fails to meet the test of moral justification (net
reduction of error over the long run) will undermine the
settlement value of rules.  The middle ground is a practice of
overruling precedent rules when and only when they are obviously
and significantly flawed in their long term effects.68
This standard is not ideal.  It does not eliminate the
conflict between overruling unjustified rules and applying rules
preemptively in particular cases; and in any event applying a
presumption, like following a rule, is not rational when a judge
believes the rule is moderately but not egregiously flawed. 
Presumptive overruling, however, appears to be the only practical
alternative for judges operating within the rule model of
precedent.
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(Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, & Daniel Kahneman, eds: Cambridge
U. Press 2002); Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and
Decision Making 121-130 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press
1993).  Fred Schauer has made the connection between availability
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11-13]; see also Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683 (1999)
(discussing the effect of availability on legislation); Cass R.
Sunstein What’s Available?: Social Influences and Behavioral
Economics, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1295 (2003) (same).
42.  See Moore, supra note 25, at 570-71.
43.  See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 34, at [mss 1-5]
summarizing differences between legislative and adjudicative
perspectives).  Rachlinski states that “Courts must resolve the
disputes before them and need not declare principles. 
Legislatures must declare general principles and cannot resolve
single disputes.”)
44.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At a Time 4
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1999)(citing the principle
that “courts should not decide issues unnecessary to the
resolution of a case”); A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decedendi of 
Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent, in Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence 148, 160-61, 167 (A.G. Guest, ed., London: Oxford
University Press 1961).  The idea that judicial rulemaking should
not exceed the requirements of particular controversies is
reflected in various justiciability doctrines adhered to by
American courts.  See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 34, at [mss 27-
29]. 
45.  See Schauer, supra note 34, at 4-7 (discussing judicial
lawmaking); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L. Rev.
633, 638-42 (1995) (pointing out that reasons judges give for
their decisions are necessarily broader than the decisions
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46.  Cf. Raz, supra note 27, at 194-201.  Raz acknowledges that
judges make law, and that, in doing so, they should act “as one
expects Parliament to act, i.e. by adopting the best rules they
can find.”  Id. at 197.  Yet he suggests that the lawmaking
function of courts differs from that of legislatures, because
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decisions is binding on future; as a consequence, “[t]here are no
pure law-creating cases.”  Id. at 194-195.  These limitations may
be descriptive of actual practice, but Raz does not explain why
they should be taken as logically necessary features of judicial
rulemaking power.
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judicial power, see, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme
Court, 1960 Term - Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
40 (1961); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive
Virtues:” Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 Harv. L. Rev.
1833 (2001).
48. For an arguable instance of prospective ruling, see Wilson v.
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61 (discussing advisory opinions and moot decisions).
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Harold Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling,
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v. Kennedy, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).  
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and Legal Reasoning 37-38, 60 (Boston: Little, Brown 1995);
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problem in Chapter Six, infra.
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Simpson, supra note 29, at 85-86 (taking the view that common law
exists by virtue of is “reception” over time); Tubbs, supra note
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62.  See sources cited at note 37, supra.
63.  See Hyde, Dominic, "Sorites Paradox", in Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta, ed. fall 2005),
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67.  See, e.g., Raz, supra note 27, at 189 (noting that courts
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Summers, Precedent in the United States (New York), in
Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study 355, 394-97 (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, eds.)(Dartmouth: Ashgate 1997)
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justification of the rule, in the manner Frederick Schauer
recommends in his discussion of “presumptive positivism.”  See
Schauer, supra note 26, at 677.  Although we reject presumptive
positivism as a solution to the general dilemma of rules, it
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rule should be jettisoned altogether.  See Alexander & Sherwin,
supra note 11, at 68-73.
1Chapter Three: The Mystification of Common-Law Reasoning
We argued in Chapter Two that there are two and only two
plausible models of judicial reasoning: the natural model and the
rule model.  The natural model incorporates two forms of
reasoning: moral reasoning through the method of reflective
equilibrium and empirical reasoning.  The rule model adds a third
form of reasoning, deduction from authoritative rules.  These
forms of reasoning are not unique to law, but are common to all
subjects of human deliberation.  In our view, they are the only
tools judges need to decide cases and the only tools they use in
fact.
This is not the prevailing view.  Texts on judicial
reasoning, as well as judges themselves, often maintain that the
primary decisionmaking method of the common law is reasoning by
analogy.1  Analogical reasoning is the special art of lawyers and
judges and the means by which the common law has successfully
adapted to changing social conditions.2  Commentators also
maintain that courts reason from legal principles, a method
closely linked to the method of analogy.3
In this chapter, we intend to demonstrate that judges cannot
be doing what they claim.  One cannot “reason” by analogy, and
legal principles are chimerical.  We shall argue as well that if
analogies and legal principles could in fact affect the course of
judicial reasoning, the results would be pernicious.
2Our position raises several questions.  One is descriptive: 
what are judges doing when they claim to reason by analogy or to
apply legal principles?  We suggest in Chapter Four that
searching for analogies and common principles that link past and
present cases is a professional habit that can play a useful role
in the development of common law.  It is, however, only a habit: 
analogies and legal principles do not decide cases.  
A second question is why judges, teachers, and textwriters
find the idea of judicial reliance on analogies and legal
principles so appealing.  One explanation for the popularity of
this account of judicial decisionmaking is that it appears to
provide a way out of the stark choice presented by the natural
and rule models of decisionmaking.  If all judicial reasoning is
natural reasoning, there is no meaningful “common law” that can
curb the errors and biases of individual judges.  The rule of law
is imperiled, at least in the absence of legislation.  If, on the
other hand, precedent rules are serious rules, then judges must
set aside their best moral judgment and decide as the rules
require.  Analogies and legal principles seem to offer a middle
course: they constrain judicial judgment without displacing it. 
Our analysis, however, suggests that the compromise is illusory. 
Natural decisionmaking and rule-governed decisionmaking are the
only courses open to judges.
3Analogical Reasoning from Case to Case
In the purest sense, analogical reasoning in law means
reasoning directly from one case to another.4  The judge observes
the facts and outcome of a past case, compares the facts of the
past case to those of a pending case, then reaches a decision in
the pending case based on similarities and differences between
the cases.  This form of reasoning has popular appeal for several
reasons.  As we have just noted, it promises a happy medium
between constraint and flexibility.  Judges must conform their
decisions to the course of prior adjudication, but they are not
precluded from assessing the merits of cases before them and they
have considerable leeway to expand on or distinguish the past
conclusions of their colleagues.5  Analogical reasoning also
conforms to a supposed principle of justice: treat like alike.6 
Another possible reason for the broad appeal of analogical
reasoning is that findings of similarity and difference among
cases may be acceptable to parties who disagree at the more
abstract level of moral principle.7
Judges use, or claim to use, case-to-case analogies in three
ways.  First, the outcome of a precedent case may dictate a like
outcome in the new case if the cases are factually similar.8
Second, the outcome of a precedent case may dictate the outcome
of new case a fortiori, because the new case presents at least as
strong a case for the same result.9  These two versions of the
4analogical method are thought to be sources of constraint: the
analogy between precedent case and new case is a reason, and
possibly a conclusive reason, for the court in the new case to
reach a result that parallels the result of the precedent case,
even if the court believes, all things considered, that the
result is wrong.  In effect, the precedent court exercises
authority by describing a set of facts and determining an outcome
that can control the outcome of later cases.
The third way in which courts purport to reason by analogy
is to “distinguish” precedent rules based on factual
dissimilarities between the cases in which the rules were
announced and new cases that appear to fall within the rules’
terms.10  Distinguishing is the flip side of a fortiori
decisionmaking, in that disanalogy provides an escape from
authority.  The precedent court exercises lawmaking authority by
announcing a general rule, but the court in a new case can avoid
the rule and return to natural reasoning.
Constraint by Similarity.  The simplest and most common way
in which courts use analogies is by finding that the case before
them is similar to a precedent case and then proceeding to reach
a parallel result.  For example: Heidi is called on to decide a
nuisance action against Karl, who is keeping an ocelot in his
house.  Surrounding homeowners point to a past case in which the
court enjoined Edward to remove his pet bear from a residential
5neighborhood.  An ocelot, they say, is like a bear, so Heidi
should likewise order Karl to remove it.
The homeowners in this case presumably are invoking the
maxim that like cases should be treated alike.  We have already
explained why, in our view, like treatment has no moral value in
sequential decisionmaking.11  But suppose we assume, for the
purpose of argument, that the principle of like treatment is
sound.  The difficulty with the analogy between Karl’s ocelot and
Edward’s bear - and with any analogy of this kind - is that,
without more, it is impossible to say that the two cases are
either alike or different.
As a factual matter, there are an infinite number of
similarities and differences between the ocelot and the bear.12 
Both are predators that might harm a small child, both are
difficult to domesticate, and both are furry mammals.  On the
other hand, Karl’s ocelot is (we can assume) smaller than
Edward’s bear, it is a type of feline indigenous to Belize, and
it has spots.  Nothing in the outcome of Edward’s case - Edward
was made to give up his bear - picks out which of these
similarities and differences are important for purposes of
comparison.  Karl can just as easily point to another past case
in which Herman was allowed to keep a Dalmatian in a residential
neighborhood.  Herman’s Dalmatian, he might say, was about that
same size as his ocelot and, like his ocelot, it had spots. 
6Where are we now?
Our point is that Heidi cannot reason that Karl’s case and
Edward’s case should be decided alike because they are similar. 
To reason that they should be decided alike, she must determine
that they are importantly similar, and to reason that they are
importantly similar, she must refer to some general proposition
that links ocelots to bears.  Without this additional link, the
facts and outcome of Edward’s case have nothing to say about
Karl’s case.13
In a recent book defending analogical reasoning in law,
Lloyd Weinreb rejects the conclusion that analogies depend on
supporting generalizations.14  Weinreb cites as an example an
opinion in which the New York Court of Appeals held the owner of
a steamboat strictly liable for losses suffered by a passenger
whose money was stolen from a stateroom.15  The court cited two
possible lines of precedent: a series of cases holding that
innkeepers were strictly liable for thefts from guest rooms, and
another series of cases holding that railroads were not strictly
liable for thefts from sleeping cars.  Ultimately, the Court of
Appeals found steamboats to be more like inns than like railroads
and held for the passenger.16  In Weinreb’s view, this
demonstrates that courts can and do decide cases on the basis of
factual similarity, without reference to general propositions
that make certain similarities relevant to the outcome.17
7We observe, first, that the court’s failure to refer
explicitly to a general rule linking steamboats to inns does not
establish that it decided the case without the aid of a
generalization.  Judicial opinions, particularly opinions from
the days of steamboats when courts were reticent about
rulemaking, may not spell out every step of the courts’
reasoning.  In any event, our point is not that courts must
engage in formal rulemaking in order to draw analogies, but only
that the reasoning they engage in to reach decisions must refer
to some general proposition that supports the analogy.  The Court
of Appeals may well have had in mind that businesses providing
lodging are strictly liable for thefts from rooms if the
accommodation is of such a type that guests are likely to expect
protection, or that providers of lodging are in a better position
than guests to furnish protection.18
If, on the other hand, Weinreb is correct that the court
detected a similarity between steamboats and inns without relying
on a supporting generalization, the analogy has no power of
constraint.  Suppose the Court of Appeals had reached the
opposite conclusion, that steamboats are like railroads, and
therefore that they are not strictly liable for thefts.  As a
matter of similarity, this is fair enough: steamboats and
railroads are both mobile.  Thus, if nothing more than brute
similarity were involved, the steamboat-railroad analogy would be
8equally as valid as the steamboat-inn analogy and, consequently,
equally incapable of determining the outcome of the case.
We can press our point further by examining more closely
what might be involved in drawing an analogy.  There are several
ways in which Heidi might reason to the conclusion that ocelots
and bears are importantly alike for the purpose of an action of
nuisance.  She might formulate a moral principle and test her
initial judgment through the method of reflective equilibrium:
the liberty of property owners to use their property as they wish
is subject to a duty to not to inflict an unreasonable risk of
harm on others, and both ocelots and bears pose unreasonable
risks of harm.19  More likely, Heidi will refer to a rule that
captures applicable moral principles in more concrete terms:
dangerous wild animals should not be kept in residential
neighborhoods, and both ocelots and bears are dangerous wild
animals.20  Once Heidi has arrived at a morally sound principle
or rule, she can deduce from it that ocelots and bears are
importantly similar, and enjoin Karl. 
 Notice that when Heidi reasons in either of these ways - by
reference to a moral principle or by reference to a less abstract
rule - the outcome of the prior case against Edward plays no
effective role in her decision.  The reason for granting an
injunction against Karl is not that his ocelot is similar to
Edward’s bear, but that his ocelot falls within a general
9principle or rule that Heidi has now determined is sound and
should apply.  The principle or rule is both necessary and
sufficient to decide Karl’s case, and the fact that the same
principle or rule applies to Edward’s case as well has no effect
on the outcome.  Another way to put this is that the lawmaker who
settles Karl’s case is not the judge in Edward’s case, but the
new judge, Heidi, who exercises authority by formulating a
principle or rule.  The reasoning Heidi uses to arrive at her
decision is not a special “analogical” form of reasoning, but
ordinary moral reasoning and deductive reasoning.
A third way in which Heidi might be said to reason to the
conclusion that Karl’s ocelot should be treated in like manner as
Edward’s bear is by referring to a legal principle that
establishes similarity between the cases.  A legal principle is a
general proposition that is consistent with existing legal
materials, including the outcomes of past cases.21  For example:
past cases include the decision enjoining Edward to remove his
bear and another decision permitting Jerome to keep his pet
crocodile.  The combination of precedents might support the legal
principle that dangerous furry wild animals are not permissible
in residential neighborhoods.  Heidi can then deduce from this
principle that Karl’s ocelot must be removed.  This method of
decision-making, unlike the methods just described, accords a
role to past outcomes.  The legal principle (no dangerous furry
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wild animals) decides the case against Karl, but the prior
decision in favor of Jerome limits the principle’s content.
If in fact legal principles are viable entities, then
analogical decisionmaking on the basis of legal principles is a
form of reasoning that is, arguably, unique to law.  We take up
the subject of reasoning from legal principles in the second half
of this chapter.22  For now, it is enough to say that we reject
the notion of legal principles as both incoherent and
undesirable.  It follows that for us, decisions that appear to
treat past outcomes as grounds for decision in current cases are
in fact either instances of ordinary moral reasoning or instances
of deduction from rules.
A fourth possibility is that Heidi might rely directly on a
perception of similarity: ocelots and bears are alike when placed
in residential neighborhoods.  At this point, we must distinguish
between reasoning and intuition.  A lifetime of experience may
allow Heidi to identify and apply a supporting general rule so
rapidly that she herself is unaware of all the steps involved. 
If so, she has reasoned to a conclusion, in an abbreviated way.
Alternatively, Heidi may simply perceive an important likeness
between ocelots and bears, perhaps because they evoke a similar
emotional response (fear) or because Heidi’s mind is wired to
respond to problems by through pattern recognition and
metaphor.23
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As a psychological matter, we cannot say which of these
descriptions is most likely to be correct.  We can say, however,
that if Heidi’s response is purely intuitive it is not a form of
reasoning.24  Reasoning entails, at a minimum, a process of
thought that one can articulate to oneself and to others.  A coin
toss is not a form of reasoning; nor is a perceived analogy. 
Whatever psychological mechanism allows judges to class ocelots
and bears together for purposes of residential land use, the
classification is not a reasoned one unless it refers to some
more general proposition that links common properties of ocelots
and bears to problem the judge is trying to solve.
At this point, the proponent of analogical decisionmaking
may say fine, what Heidi is doing is not reasoning as you define
it.  But it is what judges do.  They manage to decide cases in
this way.  This is, in effect, Weinreb’s argument for analogical
reasoning in law.25
To answer this argument, we first point out that the subject 
under discussion is analogical reasoning as a form of constraint. 
Precedent outcomes are supposed to dictate, or at least to
provide reasons for, parallel outcomes in cases judged to be
similar.  With this assumption in place, we can return to Heidi’s
decision and consider more closely how she might reach it.
Suppose first that Heidi looks at the precedent case
involving Edward’s bear and has an intuition of important
12
similarity between Edward’s bear and Karl’s ocelot.  She then
hypothesizes a general proposition that supports her intuition:
dangerous wild animals should not be kept in residential
neighborhoods.  If she is satisfied with this proposition as a
reason for decision, and if she confirms that both ocelots and
bears are dangerous wild animals, she will enter an injunction
against Karl.26  We have no difficulty with this method of
decisionmaking, but it is not truly an analogical method. 
Assuming our description of Heidi’s mental process is correct,
the intuition of important similarity plays only a minor role, as
the inspiration for a more complete process of reasoning.  Nor
does the outcome of Edward’s case constrain Heidi’s decision. 
The lawmaker is not the precedent judge, but Heidi, who engages
in ordinary moral and deductive reasoning, with the help of
intuition, to formulate a rule of decision.
Now suppose that Heidi first reasons to a tentative
conclusion about Karl’s case: she determines that, based on an
appropriate balance of liberty and protection against harm, she
should permit Karl to keep his ocelot.  She then studies Edward’s
case and has an intuition of important similarity between
Edward’s case and Karl’s.  Next, she hypothesizes a general
proposition that supports her intuition of similarity: dangerous
wild animals should not be kept in residential neighborhoods. 
She tests this proposition with further examples (crocodiles,
13
lions), finds that it fits her intuitions about these cases and
also seems to fit her beliefs about liberty and harm. 
Ultimately, she abandons her initial conclusion, applies the
proposition that dangerous wild animals should not be kept in
residential neighborhoods, and enters an injunction against Karl. 
Again, Heidi’s decision is not truly analogical; her method is
ordinary reasoning and Edward’s case does not constrain the
outcome.  Heidi’s intuition of important similarity between
Karl’s ocelot and Edward’s bear simply triggered a reasoned
reexamination of her original position.
Another possibility is that Heidi begins by reasoning to a 
conclusion in favor of Karl, based on the comparative moral value
of liberty and protection against harm.  She then studies
Edward’s case and has an intuition of important similarity
between Karl’s ocelot and Edward’s bear.  Without more, she
decides to treat the two cases alike and order Karl to remove his
ocelot from the neighborhood.  This reconstruction supports the
possibility of a purely analogical approach to judicial
decisionmaking, but it strikes us as implausible.  There is
nothing in Heidi’s unconscious and inaccessible intuition of
similarity between ocelots and bears that provides a reason
capable of overriding the conclusions she has reached through a
process of moral reasoning.  Only if she can construct a
justification for the intuition, as in the prior example, will
14
she abandon her reasoned moral judgment.
The possibility that poses the greatest difficulty for our
position is this: Heidi begins with an intuition of important
similarity between ocelots and bears.  She then decides to reason
no further and decide Karl’s case as the precedent judge decided
Edward’s case: remove the ocelot.  Assuming that it is in fact
psychologically possible for Heidi to intuit important similarity
without referring to a supporting generalization, this is a
genuinely analogical decision.  Given Heidi’s intuition, the
precedent outcome controls the outcome of Karl’s case.  The
lawmaker is the precedent judge, who has exercised authority by
describing facts and reaching a decision that dictates a like
decision in Karl’s case.  This is, however, a very impoverished
view of judicial decisionmaking, which we are reluctant to
attribute to judges adjudicating in good faith.  The intuition of
important similarity on which it relies is completely opaque: it
provides no warrant - no accessible justifying reason - for
Heidi’s decision.  We emphasize again that the two cases are not
identical; they are only felt to be similar (why?).  There is no
way even to think about whether Heidi’s judgment of important
similarity is right or wrong.27
At this point, our argument is partly a normative one.  As
an analytical matter, we can say that purely intuitive analogical
decisionmaking is not a form of reasoning.  We can also say that
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what appears to be analogical decisionmaking may in fact be
ordinary reasoning.  Finally, we can return to one of the basic
assumptions we made in our initial discussion of settlement as a
social end and a justification for authority: the assumption that
settlement, as a social end, means reasoned settlement.28 
Members of a community choose an authority to translate values
they recognize as reasons for action into particular decisions or
rules when their own judgments conflict.  Whether the authority’s
conclusion is right or wrong, it is expected that the process of
translation will be capable, at least in principle, of
articulation and justification.  Otherwise, the choice of an
authority is no different from the flip of a coin.  This leads to
the normative point: judicial decisionmaking, as an exercise of
authority, ought to meet this minimal requirement, and therefore
ought to entail more than blind, untested, and untestable
intuition.
A Fortiori Constraint.  We have argued that factual
similarities between cases cannot constrain judicial
decisionmaking.  Similarities are infinite; therefore some rule
or principle is necessary to identify important similarities. 
Once a court has identified such a rule or principle, the rule or
principle, rather than the factual similarities themselves,
determines the outcome of the pending case.  Analogy alone,
therefore, does not enable courts to extend the “law” of past
16
cases into new domains.
It might be argued, however, that analogies can play a more
limited role in judicial decisionmaking by dictating outcomes “a
fortiori.”29  In this version of analogical reasoning, the court
compares the relative strength of two sets of facts - the facts
of the precedent case and the facts of a new case now under
consideration.  If the facts of the new case provide support for
the outcome reached in the precedent case that is stronger than
the support provided by the facts of the precedent case itself,
then it follows, a fortiori, that the new court should reach a
parallel result.
For example: Heidi is considering a nuisance claim against
Felix, who has established a private zoo in a residential
neighborhood.  On display at the zoo are a bear, a lion, and a
python.  Heidi discovers a prior case in which a court ordered
Edward to remove his pet bear from a residential neighborhood.  A
fortiori, Heidi should order Felix to close his zoo.  This
conclusion follows even if Heidi believes Edward’s case was
wrongly decided, and, accordingly, would have held for Felix in
the absence of Edward’s case.
The a fortiori method of decisionmaking appears more
promising as a form of case-to-case reasoning than a method that
relies solely on the court’s sense of similarity.  Here, the
court compares cases and draws what appears to be a necessary
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conclusion about the outcome of one from the facts and outcome of
another.  As we shall demonstrate, however, a fortiori reasoning
suffers from a number of problems that diminish the effect of the
precedent case to the vanishing point.  Moreover, to the extent
that a fortiori comparisons do in fact dictate outcomes, the
possibility of erroneous precedents grossly distorts their
operation.  Given the presence of even a few past mistakes, a
fortiori analogies can wreak havoc with the overall body of law.
The first hurdle in a fortiori reasoning is determining what
facts are in play.  The present judge, Heidi, does not have
access to all the facts of precedent case (the case of Edward’s
bear).  The parties’ lawyers will have selected a subset of all
the facts pertaining to Edward and his bear for presentation to
the court, and the judge (or an appellate court) is likely to
have culled the evidence further in composing an opinion.  One
possibility for Heidi is to assume that the comparison must be
between the classes of facts named by the prior court and the
facts of her new case.  If the court in Edward’s case mentioned
only that Edward was keeping a “bear,” then the presence of any
type of bear can support a claim of nuisance.30  This approach
could result in significant constraint: a precedent court could,
by design or by mistake, exert a very strong influence on future
cases by casting its description of facts in general terms.  At
the same time, it could produce unwanted results.  An opinion in
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Edward’s case stating that Edward was keeping an animal would
result in a great many a fortiori nuisances, not all sensible.
As a result, courts are more likely to take the view that
the appropriate comparison is between particulars actually
described in the prior opinion and the facts of the new case.31 
If the court in Edward’s case stated without further elaboration
that Edward was keeping a “bear,” then details about the bear in
Felix’s zoo might serve to distinguish the case against Felix. 
Once judges take this more creative approach to factual
comparison of cases, however, an a fortiori effect is very easy
to avoid.  No two cases are perfectly identical in their facts,
and the current judge need only pick out some feature of his or
her case that was not mentioned in the precedent opinion and
that, if it was not in fact present in the precedent case, tip
the scales in favor of a new result.  Assume that Heidi is
sympathetic to Felix’s zoo.  If Felix’s bear is declawed and kept
in a sturdy cage, and if the opinion in Edward’s case does not
specify that Edward’s bear was likewise declawed and kept in a
sturdy cage, Heidi can treat these as distinguishing facts. 
Morever, in any case in which the a fortiori effect of a
precedent case makes a difference to the current judge’s decision
- that is, in any case in which the judge would otherwise reach a
different result - we can assume that the judge will be tempted
to manipulate factual assumptions in this way to avoid a result
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the judge thinks is wrong.
In theory, factual comparisons between cases are not
infinitely manipulable.  The judge must identify facts that tip
the scales, or in other words, facts about the new case that, if
not also present in the precedent case, make the new case a
weaker case for the precedent outcome.  This leads to another
problem, which is how a judge can “weigh” facts in favor of one
outcome or another.
To weigh the facts of two cases, the judge must first
determine what outcome particular facts tend to favor, and then
assign a weight to that tendency.32  The tendency of a fact may
seem obvious: the large size of a bear favors an order to remove
the bear from a residential neighborhood.  But this is not as
simple a matter as it first appears.  The size of a bear does not
in itself recommend an injunction.  Bear size must be linked to
bear removal either by an inaccessible intuition or by a process
of reasoning that relies on general propositions: owners must not
impose unreasonable risks on the safety of those around them, and
large bears pose a greater safety risk than small bears.33  In
other words, a fortiori reasoning runs aground for the same
reasons that simple similarity-based analogies run aground: facts
alone have no implications for future decisionmaking. 
A further problem is that if the new case involves facts
that tend both in favor of and against the outcome of the
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precedent case, the court must assign weight to the facts in
order to determine whether the a fortiori effect of the precedent
case is dispelled.  This may not be possible if the tendencies of
different facts depend on wholly different values.  For example:
Felix’s zoo contains not only a bear but other animals as well, a
fact that presumably favors an injunction.  Suppose, however,
that Felix’s zoo also doubles as a breeding facility for
endangered species, a fact that favors a decision for Felix.  If
human safety and preservation of species are incommensurable
values, neither of which has lexical priority, there is no way to
weigh them in the manner an a fortiori comparison calls for. 
Calculation of the relative strength of additional animals (in
favor of  an injunction) and a breeding program (against an
injunction) requires either a ranking of values or a common
metric for measurement.34
Some moral systems, such as utilitarianism, provide a
universal metric that allows, in principle, for quantitative
comparison of the facts of past and present cases.  Within a
system of this kind, a fortiori comparisons may be logically, if
not practically, possible.  The consequences, however, are
nonsensical.  We must assume that, in any legal system, some
precedent cases have been erroneously decided: if judges always
decided correctly, there would be no need for precedential
constraint.  We must also assume that, but for precedent case,
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the judge in the new case would decide the new case differently;
otherwise the precedent would have no effect.  In these
circumstances, a process of quantitative comparison yields
results that are perverse and ultimately self-contradictory.35
To illustrate: homeowners have asked Heidi to enjoin Max
from opening a gas station in their neighborhood.36  After
calculating potential decreases in human happiness from traffic,
fumes, and aesthetic offense, as well as potential increases in
happiness from financial profit, convenience, and employment,
Heidi finds that the gas station is likely cause a net loss of
three utils.  Accordingly, she is inclined to grant an
injunction.  Max, however, points to a prior case in which Jerome
was allowed to keep a crocodile in a residential neighborhood. 
These cases may not appear to have much in common.  But assume
Heidi believes the prior decision was wrong: by her calculation,
Jerome’s crocodile was likely (ex ante) to cause a net loss of 6
utils.  Max can now argue that in any case in which a use of land
will cause a net loss of six or fewer utils, Jerome’s case is an
a fortiori precedent for denying an injunction.  In fact, if
utils are the denominator for comparison, Max might be able to
cite a wholly unrelated precedent - say, an erroneous decision in
the field of contract law - as a reason to decide in his favor.
Alternatively, Heidi might compare potential gains and
losses of utility.37  Assume that the court in Jerome’s case
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concluded, erroneously, that the happiness Jerome would gain from
his crocodile exceeded the loss of happiness his neighbors would
suffer from contemplating the risks posed by a crocodile residing
nearby.  Heidi believes that in Max’s case, the neighbors’
potential loss  of happiness due to traffic, fumes, and aesthetic
offense will exceed Max’s and others’ gains in happiness due to
profits, convenience, and employment.  But if she also concludes
that fumes, traffic and aesthetic loss from Max’s gas station
will cause a lesser loss of happiness than the proximity of
Jerome’s crocodile was likely to cause, and that profit,
convenience, and employment from the gas station will produce
more gains in happiness than Jerome’s enjoyment of his crocodile,
then she is again constrained, a fortiori, to deny the injunction
against Max.  (Heidi believes that in Max’s case, fact set x
outweighs fact set y; but in the precedent case, fact set b was
found to outweigh fact set a; if a outweighs x and y outweighs b,
then the precedent case demands that Heidi treat y as if it
outweighs x.)  This cannot be a sensible way to resolve the
dispute.
The problem is compounded by the presence of both correct
and incorrect precedents.  Assume that Heidi discovers two
precedents.  One is Jerome’s case, in which the court denied an
injunction, resulting in a net loss, ex ante, of six utils.  The
other is Edward’s case, in which the court ordered Edward to
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remove his bear.  Heidi determines that Edward’s case was correct
and that it resulted in a net gain, ex ante, of one util.  These
two cases stand as precedents both for granting and for denying
an injunction in Max’s case (and in all other cases in which the
sum of expected utils if an injunction is granted is between one
and six).
Perhaps a fortiori decisionmaking can be redescribed in a
way that gives guidance to courts in comparing the facts of past
and present cases.  Grant Lamond suggests that precedent requires
later courts to assume that precedent cases were correctly
decided on their facts.38  According to Lamond’s “reason-based”
account of precedent, a later court must accept the “ratio” of a
precedent case - - the proposition supporting its outcome - as a
sufficient reason for the outcome in the factual context of the
precedent case.39  Then, if the facts entailed by the ratio of
the precedent case are present in a later case, the later court
must reach a parallel result unless additional facts create a
reason for a different outcome that is strong enough to defeat
the reason given by the precedent ratio.  If no such facts
appear, the prior case is an a fortiori precedent.  Lamond refers
to this a “reason-based” account of precedent because it compares
the reasons that justify outcomes in the context of particular
facts.40 
For example: homeowners have asked Heidi to enjoin Max from
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opening a gas station.  Heidi finds a precedent case in which the
presiding judge stated that “businesses that significantly
increase traffic in residential neighborhoods are nuisances” and
enjoined construction of a Pizza Hut.41  Heidi must grant the
injunction against Max unless she concludes that the convenience
of a local gas station defeats the burden of significant new
traffic.
Assuming that Heidi must accept the precedent judge’s
statement of the ratio of its decision,42 the precedent opinion
appears to constrain Heidi by providing a reason that must be
overcome: protection of homeowners against business traffic. 
Suppose, however, that Heidi believes that the precedent judge’s
reasoning was wrong; in her view, traffic is unavoidable if the
neighborhood is to have normal amenities.  If so the reason
generated by the new fact (local gas is convenient) will always
be “stronger” than the reason for the precedent outcome, from
Heidi’s point of view.  Again, there is no real limit on what
Heidi can decide.
A fortiori decisionmaking has one virtue: it taps the
ability of reasoners to make comparative judgments.  Comparing
the degree to which a certain property is present in two objects
- light A is brighter than light B - is an easier task for the
human mind to manage than determining an absolute value - how
bright is light A?43  Thus, judges can make a fortiori judgments
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about past and present cases with greater confidence than they
can assess present cases in isolation.  Yet this does not mean
that judges can reason from case to case without more.  A
comparison of cases is possible only by reference to a general
proposition that identifies which features the cases should be
compared.  To know that lights A and B should be judged on the
scale of brightness, one first must have in mind a rule, “choose
the brightest light.”
Distinguishing Precedents.  A third form of analogical
decisionmaking, very popular among courts, is the use of
dissimilarities to avoid the implications of precedent rules.  If
a new case falls within the terms of a precedent rule, but
includes facts that are not specifically mentioned in the rule
and were not present in the precedent case in which the rule was
announced, the court can “distinguish” the new case and reach a
result contrary to what the rule prescribes.44 
Distinguishing precedents can be seen as the reverse of
expansion of precedents on the basis of similarity: here, the
court limits the effect of precedents on the basis of
dissimilarity.  The process of distinguishing precedents can also
be conceived of as a reverse a fortiori calculation.   The new
court is free to reach a new result if the facts of the new case
provide weaker support for the precedent outcome than the facts
of the precedent case.45
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For example: Andrei is considering a nuisance claim against
Herman, who is keeping a large dog in a residential neighborhood. 
He discovers a prior case in which Heidi ordered Karl to give up
his ocelot and stated that “large animals in residential
neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”  By the general terms of
Heidi’s rule, Herman’s dog must go.  According to conventional
understanding, however, Andrei can distinguish the precedent rule
on the ground that Herman’s dog, unlike Karl’s ocelot, is a
domestic animal, and the rule does not say in so many words that
large domestic animals are nuisances per se.  As a consequence,
the precedent rule is modified to provide that “large wild
animals in residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”
The first point we wish to make about the practice of
distinguishing is that it is not, as is sometimes suggested, a
qualified version of the rule model of precedent.46  Andrei
appears to consult a precedent rule (no large animals), identify
a fact about Herman’s case that is not named in the predicate of
the rule, restate the rule in a modified form (no large wild
animals), and apply it to the case before him.  But in fact, the
precedent rule plays no rule in Andrei’s decision.
To see this, suppose that the new case before Andrei is the
case of Jerome, who is keeping a pet crocodile in his home. 
Andrei is sympathetic to Jerome.  Suppose further that in the
precedent case, Heidi ordered Karl to remove his ocelot from a
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residential neighborhood and stated a rule, “wild animals in
residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”  To distinguish
this precedent,  Andrei can point to the fact that Jerome’s
crocodile, unlike Karl’s ocelot, has no fur.  The precedent rule
does not specifically mention animals without fur, therefore
Andrei is free to decide in favor of Jerome.  Moreover, this type
of distinction will always be possible, because no precedent rule
can be specific enough to cover all the particulars of all future
cases.  No matter what the rule, Andrei will be able to find some
fact about Jerome’s case that the rule does not particularly
name.  It follows that the rule has no constraining effect on the
outcome of the case.
Joseph Raz has suggested that the practice of distinguishing
precedents, as conventionally understood, constrains judges by
limiting the manner in which they can modify precedent rules.47 
According to Raz, a judge seeking to distinguish a precedent rule
must restate the rule in a way that meets two conditions: the
modified rule must be the precedent rule with some further
condition added, and the modified rule must support the outcome
of the precedent case.  He illustrates with an example in which
the precedent case involved facts a, b, c, d, and e, the result
was X, and the opinion announced a rule “if A, B and C, then X.” 
The new case involves facts a, b, c, d, and f, but not e.  The
court can distinguish the new case and announce a modified rule
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“if A, B, C, and E, then X,” or a modified rule, “if A, B, C, and
not F, then X.”  But it cannot announce a modified rule “if A, B,
C, and not D, then X, because this rule does not support the
outcome of the precedent case.48
In our view, this constraint is illusory.  Assume again that
in Karl’s case, Heidi announced the rule “wild animals in
residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”  Andrei
distinguishes Jerome’s case on the ground that Jerome’s crocodile
has no fur.  He then announces a rule, “furry wild animals in
residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”  This may not be
an ideal rule, and it authorizes a result that seems contrary to
the values the precedent rule was designed to protect; but it
meets Raz’s two conditions: it is the precedent rule with a
condition added, and it justifies the outcome of the precedent
case.  Nor do Raz’s conditions guarantee that the modified rule
will be similar in effect to the precedent rule.  Andrei could
announce a rule, “wild animals that are three year-old ocelots
with one lame foot are nuisances per se” without running afoul of
the supposedly constraining conditions.  But the pattern of
future nuisance decisions under the rule will be radically
different from the pattern one would have expected under Heidi’s
rule, “wild animals are nuisances per se.”
Raz alludes to a third possible condition, that the court
should adopt “only that modification which will best improve the
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rule.”49  From the standpoint of a judge who thinks the precedent
rule is misconceived, however, any narrowing of the rule is an
improvement, and the narrowest version may be the best, however
ungainly.  A condition requiring that any modification of the
precedent rule must serve the purposes of the rule, or that any
modification must conform to common sense, might help to solve
the problem.50  But these conditions are too indeterminate to
provide effective constraint.
Thus, when judges distinguish precedent rules, the precedent
rules have no constraining effect, either on the outcomes of new
cases or on the content of the rules announced by new judges.  
When the new court announces a “modified” rule, it is not
following precedent but acting as a lawmaking authority in its
own right.  The new court, not the precedent court, is the author
of the rule.
Beyond this, many of the observations we have already made
about analogical decisionmaking apply equally to the dis-
analogies used to distinguish precedents.  The possibilities for
factual distinction between any two cases, like the possibilities
for findings of factual similarity, are infinite.  Further, as in
the case of a fortiori decisionmaking, the factual descriptions
provided by precedent judges place no meaningful limit on judges’
ability to distinguish new cases because current judges are
likely to assume that facts not actually mentioned in precedent
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opinions were not present.51  The outcome of the prior case does
not in itself illuminate which dissimilarities are important. 
Therefore, the practice of distinguishing is most plausibly and
appealingly understood as a process of ordinary reasoning that
refers to moral principles or rules to identify important
differences among cases, rather than a decisionmaking method in
which the outcome of one case bears directly on the outcome of
another.  So understood, findings of dissimilarity, like findings
or similarity, do not entail a form of “legal” reasoning that
differs from the reasoning used in any other field. 
Summary: Why Purely Analogical Decisionmaking Does Not
Exist.  Analogical reasoning is supposed to act as a constraint
on judicial decisionmaking, either dictating parallel results a
fortiori, dictating parallel results in similar cases, or
determining when judges may avoid precedent rules.  We hope we
have shown that it does none of these things.
 Analogical decisionmaking based on factual similarity
between cases is either intuitive or deductive.  If the process
of identifying important similarities is intuitive, the precedent
case does not constrain the outcome of the new case in any
predictable or even detectable way.  If the process is deductive,
the rules or principles that govern similarity, rather than the
outcome of the precedent case, determine the result of the new
case.
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A precedent case cannot determine the result of a new case a
fortiori because some fact about the new case can always be cited
as weighing in favor of a different result and therefore
dispelling the a fortiori effect of the precedent.  Moreover, the
notion of weighing sets of facts is problematic.  To “weigh” two
different sets of facts, a judge identify a common metric for
comparison.  If such a metric exists at all, its application to a
body of precedent that includes incorrect decisions will result
in legal chaos.
Finally, distinguishing precedent rules is an open-ended
process in which the precedent rules themselves have no
constraining effect.  Rather than applying modified precedent
rules, judges in new cases exercise rulemaking authority,
constrained only by such limits as there may be on findings of
dissimilarity.  Findings of dissimilarity, however, can only be
limited by independent principles or rules that establish the
importance of particular facts.  The prior decisions themselves
ultimately are inert.
There is one possible qualification to what we have just
said.  We noted in our discussion of constraint by similarity
that a court might base a determination of similarity, not on an
independent moral principle or rule, but on a “legal” principle
that explains precedent cases.  If so, precedent cases might
constrain current outcomes by restricting the content of the
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legal principle on which the analogy is based.  We take up, and
reject, this possibility in the next section.
Reasoning from Legal Principles
We have argued that analogical reasoning does not exist,
apart from supportin52g general rules.  To the extent that the
analogies are supported by moral principles, morally justified
rules, or serious precedent rules, analogical reasoning is not a
special form of reasoning known to lawyers, but an exercise in
ordinary moral, empirical, and deductive reasoning.  There
remains, however, one alternative possibility, which has played a
leading part in the mystification of legal reasoning: the
possibility of reasoning from legal principles.
The idea that judges decide cases by reasoning from legal
principles has a venerable history and a strong resonance for
most lawyers and judges.  According to this view of legal
reasoning, a judge presiding over a dispute surveys the body of
legal precedents, formulates a principle that explains them, then
applies the principle to determine the rights of the parties in
the pending case.53  Law students are taught to reason in this
way, judicial opinions follow this pattern, and traditional
academic commentary employs a similar method to explain the law
and propose reform.   
The Nature of Legal Principles.  The best known and most
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rigorous account of the process of reasoning from legal
principles comes from Ronald Dworkin.54  Dworkin describes legal
principles as the morally best principles capable of explaining a
substantial proportion of past legal decisions.  More precisely,
two criteria govern the formulation of legal principles: legal
principles must satisfy a threshold requirement of “fit” with
existing legal materials, and they must come as close as they
can, given the requirement of fit, to being morally ideal.55
Legal principles do not dictate outcomes in the manner of
rules; rather, they are “starting points” for decisionmaking,56
which “weigh” in favor of outcomes.57  At the same time, legal
principles are authoritative in the sense that the combination of
legal principles applicable to any case determines the judge’s
decision.  Other legal materials do not directly govern judicial
decisionmaking, but serve only as data points for construction of
legal principles.58  Effectively, therefore, legal principles
make up the content of the common law. 
For example: Heidi must decide the case of Roscoe, who is
planning to open a paintball arena a residential neighborhood. 
Surrounding owners argue that a paintball arena will increase
traffic and noise and should be enjoined as a nuisance.  The
parties refer to a number of prior nuisance cases: in one line of
cases, courts enjoined defendants from keeping a bear, an ocelot,
and a crocodile, respectively, in residential neighborhoods,
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citing danger to the safety of homeowners.  In another line of
cases, courts declined to enjoin a tennis club, a bowling alley,
a golf course, and a rifle range.  An archery range, however, was
enjoined.  Courts have also permitted a day care center, a
halfway house serving non-violent offenders, and a carefully
managed sewage treatment plant to operate in residential
neighborhoods.  From these precedents, Heidi abduces a legal
principle: landowners in residential neighborhoods are at liberty
to pursue activities that pose no significant risk to human
safety or health.  If Roscoe can show that the safety risks of
paintball are minimal, and if no other principles are in play,
Heidi will then deny the injunction and enter a judgment for
Roscoe.
One use (or purported use) of legal principles is to derive
solutions to new cases from past decisions.  Heidi’s decision in
favor of Roscoe, for example, can be viewed as an extension of
the line of cases permitting non-dangerous recreational
activities in residential neighborhoods by means of a principle
that ties those cases together and explains their relation to
other cases.  Legal principles can also be used to avoid rules
announced in past cases.  Suppose, for example, that in the prior
case involving an archery range, the court announced a rule,
“sports involving mechanically enhanced projectiles are nuisances
per se in a residential neighborhood.”  In the sport of
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paintball, players use guns to shoot paint at one another;
therefore, the precedent rule, treated as a serious rule, calls
for an injunction.  In a regime governed by legal principles,
however, rules do not operate as serious rules, but only as
evidence of legal principles.  It follows that legal principles
override announced rules.  Heidi can conclude that the principle
that best supports both the pattern of past outcomes and the
precedent rule is the principle that owners are at liberty to
pursue activities that pose no significant risk to health or
safety.  This principle explains the outcome of the archery case
and is arguably consistent with the purposes of the no-
mechanically-enhanced-projectile rule; at the same time, it
permits a decision for Roscoe, contrary to the terms of the rule.
Descriptions of legal principles vary as to the sources from
which such principles are drawn and with which they must “fit.”  
Some accounts suggest that, as far as the common law is
concerned, only the facts and outcomes of past decisions are
relevant; the current judge is free to disregard rules and other
statements found in past opinions.59  This description of legal
principles connects them to analogical reasoning: legal
principles are the generalizations drawn from past results, which
judges can then use to identify relevant similarities among
cases.
In other accounts, rules and principles set forth in prior
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opinions, as well as facts and outcomes, are pertinent to the
content of legal principles.60  But here a distinction must be
drawn: a judge reasoning from legal principles treats past
statements as data from which to derive a principle; disposition
of the case is then governed not by the past statements but by
the principle they are found to support.  If the judge treats
past statements as direct constraints on his or her decision, the
judge is not applying a legal principle in the Dworkinian sense,
but deducing an outcome from posited precedent rules.
Legal principles, therefore, are fundamentally different
from legal rules.  The difference is not a function of the form
of the prior judge’s statement but of the role it plays in the
current judge’s decision.  If Heidi decides for Roscoe because
prior judges have stated that activities that pose no significant
risk to human health or safety are permissible in residential
neighborhoods, she is treating past statements as rules.  If she
decides for Roscoe because she believes past judicial statements
about safety support a principle that activities that pose no
significant risk to human health or safety are permissible, she
is following the method that Dworkin recommends.
Another way to put this is that a judicial rule is a norm
posited by a prior judge.61  The precedent judge acts as
lawmaker, exercising authority by announcing a rule.62  A
principle is not posited, but organic.  Due to the dimension of
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fit, it changes as the body of legal decisions changes over
time.63  The lawmaker is the current judge, who defines and
applies a principle that appears consistent with the decisions
and statements of past judges.  Future judges, however, will
remake the principle as they decide the cases that come before
them against the background of precedent cases as those stand at
the time of their decisions.  Thus, legal principles are not
posited by past judges; nor are they posited by the current judge
who constructs them for the purpose of deciding a case.
Rules also differ from legal principles in that they
determine the results of future cases that fall within their
terms.  Legal principles, in contrast, are not determinative of
outcomes.  Instead, they are reasons for decision that have
“weight” when they come in conflict with other legal principles. 
The outcome of any given case depends on the balance of
applicable principles.64  For example, the legal principle in
Roscoe’s case (landowners in residential neighborhoods are at
liberty to pursue activities that pose no significant risk to
human safety or health) might be restated as two principles: a
principle that owners should be allowed the maximum use of their
property and a competing principle that owners must not use their
property in ways that pose significant health or safety risks on
neighbors.  If the latter of which proves to be of greater
weight, Roscoe is enjoined.
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At the same time, legal principles are not moral principles;
they are principles internal to law.  The dimension of fit
requires that legal principles must conform to the pattern of
past decisions, even if, as a consequence, the principles that
result are morally flawed.65  Legal principles need only be the
morally best principles that pass the threshold of fit.
Thus, Heidi may believe that paintball has no redeeming
social value that justifies the burdens of traffic and noise it
imposes on surrounding owners.  More generally, she may believe
that the correct moral principle for nuisance cases holds that
landowners may not engage in activities that pose significant
burdens of any kind on surrounding owners unless those burdens
are justified by the importance of the activity as a service to
the community.  In Roscoe’s case, however, prior decisional
history appears to rule out Heidi’s ideal principle.  Recall that
in prior cases, courts enjoined several owners from keeping wild
animals and enjoined an owner from opening an archery range, but
permitted other owners to maintain a tennis club, a bowling
alley, a golf course, a rifle range, a day care center, a halfway
house, and sewage treatment plant.  A perfect fit with these
decision is not required: for example, Heidi probably can
disregard the rifle range case as a mistake.  But three of ten
other precedents permitted recreational uses that were likely to
increase traffic and noise.  Therefore the threshold of fit seems
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to require that Heidi modify her ideal principle to allow uses
that do not fill an important social need, unless those uses pose
a threat to health or safety.  In other words, given the
inevitable fact of erroneous outcomes in the past, legal
principles are the most morally attractive morally incorrect
principles that fit the background of prior decisions.66
A further observation, related to the last, is that the
process of formulating legal principles is not a process of
reflective equilibrium.67  The structure of reasoning is similar
- the judge refers to particular judgments and formulates a
principle to support them; but the effect is radically different. 
Legal principles must be consistent with a certain (undefined)
percentage of the judgments with which the reasoner begins.  Not
all past decisions can be rejected.  In the case of reflective
equilibrium, the reasoner can reject any and all judgments that
cannot be explained by what the reasoner holds confidently to be
a morally correct principle.
A second, closely related difference between judicial
formulation of legal principles and the method of reflective
equilibrium is that the judgments from which the reasoner (the
current judge) draws a legal principle are not moral judgments,
but authoritative acts by past judges.  They may be morally
correct or incorrect, but this does not matter; until the
threshold of fit has been passed, the fact that past decisions
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were wrong does not alter their effect on the content of the
principle.  In contrast, the judgments from which a moral
principle is drawn in the process of reflective equilibrium are
moral judgments, whose effect on outcome of reasoning depends on
their ability to survive reflection.
As with analogical reasoning, much of the appeal of legal
principles lies in the compromise they appear to allow between
unconstrained natural reasoning and serious rules that preempt
reasoning.68  Judges reasoning from legal principles are
constrained by the limits that institutional history (in the form
of past decisions) places on the principles’ content.  At the
same time, judges need not set aside moral values or abstain from
exercising their powers of reason when deciding cases.  They must
formulate and apply the most morally attractive principles that
fit with institutional history, and in doing so they can discard
at least some past mistakes.
Another part of the allure of legal principles is the
promise of a body of law shaped by internal coherence.69  Legal
principles maintain consistency among past, present, and future
decisions and across doctrinal boundaries.  A regime of legal
principles, in which coherence provides a standard for
development of law, has the added advantage of providing an
answer (although not necessarily a unique answer) to every
dispute, which is grounded in preexisting law.70  The right
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outcome in any new case is the outcome that, in the judge’s view,
best fits what has come before.
Or so it may seem.  We do not accept the claims made for
this form of decisionmaking.  As a matter of logic, we do not
believe legal principles are viable as constraints on judicial
reasoning.  If they do constrain, we believe they are a vice, not
a virtue, of legal decisionmaking.
Faulty Logic.  Working from Dworkin’s description of legal
principles, we can demonstrate in two ways that legal principles
are incapable of constraining judicial decisions.  Our first
argument is based on the notion of weight: the effect of a legal
principle on the outcome of any dispute is a function of its
weight in competition with other principles.71  The process by
which a judge is to calculate a principle’s weight, however, is
mysterious.72
Recall that, by hypothesis, legal principles differ from
morally correct principles because they must be made to fit a
body of decisions that is sure to contain some mistakes.  It is
possible that in a given area of law, so few decisions will be
mistaken that the legal principle suggested by past cases will
correspond to a correct moral principle.  But it is equally
possible, and probably more likely, that the legal principle
suggested by past decisions in an area of law will not pass the
threshold of fit unless it conforms to a significant number of
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past errors.  The best legal principle will then be morally
incorrect.  Further, assuming that there are both morally correct
and morally incorrect legal principles immanent in existing legal
materials, it must be the case that morally incorrect legal
principles will sometimes outweigh morally correct legal
principles: otherwise, all outcomes would follow from morally
correct principles and past outcomes would have no practical
effect on present decisions.  Given these assumptions, the
question for the judge becomes, what weight should a morally
incorrect legal principle have in competition with other correct
and incorrect principles?  
There is nothing in the past decisions themselves that can
determine the weight of the legal principle they support.  The
judge might count the number of decisions that support a
particular legal principle, but the number of supporting
decisions does not tell her what weight the erroneous legal
principle has as a reason for decision in the current case.  Nor
can a judge refer to correct moral principles to assign weight to
an incorrect legal principle, because correct moral principles
will always dictate that incorrect principles should have no
weight at all.  In other words, there is no possible standard for
determining the weight of incorrect legal principles: their
weight must be a matter of unregulated intuition or discretion. 
Therefore, legal principles cannot control what the judge
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ultimately decides.73
Our second argument to show that legal principles cannot
constrain judicial decisionmaking is based on the requirement of
fit with past decisions.  An initial difficulty is that the
necessary degree of fit cannot be specified in a non-arbitrary
way.  We know only that a legal principle must fit well enough
with past decisions to meet the objective of coherence, and that
it must fit some number of mistaken decisions if it is to be
distinguished from natural reasoning.  Beyond this, nothing in
the idea of a legal principle tells where the threshold of fit
lies and how many recalcitrant decisions the judge can ignore.74
But suppose we assume that judges can interpret the
threshold of fit in a reasonably determinate way.  This brings us
to our main point, which is that the requirement of fit is not a
real constraint: a judge can always devise a legal principle that
fits perfectly with past cases and also applies a correct moral
principle to present and future cases.  To do this, the judge
simply states the applicable moral principle and adds an
exception describing past outcomes.75
For example, assume that the correct moral principle
governing land use in residential neighborhoods is that
landowners may not engage in activities that pose significant
burdens on surrounding owners unless those burdens are justified
by the activity’s importance as a service to the community. 
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Heidi believes that, based on this principle, she should enjoin
Roscoe from opening his paintball arena; however, she also
believes that the correct moral principle is at odds with past
decisions allowing a tennis club, a bowling alley, and a golf
course to operate in residential neighborhoods (decisions X, Y,
and Z).  To escape this bind, she can formulate a legal
principle, “landowners may not engage in activities that impose
significant burdens on surrounding owners unless those burdens
are justified by the activity’s importance as a service to the
community; except that they may operate the specific tennis
clubs, bowling alleys, or golf courses permitted in past cases X,
Y, and Z.”  This principle supports all past decisions but favors
an injunction against Roscoe.  Given that the past cases are
past, and that X, Y, and Z can never recur, the principle also
favors morally correct outcomes in all future cases.  In its
prospective effect, Heidi’s legal principle is indistinguishable
from the correct moral principle.  In practice, therefore, the
“legal” component of the principle is inert.
If judicial maneuvering of this kind seems implausible,
recall that the only cases in which legal principles constrain
natural reasoning are cases in which the judge believes the
outcome indicated by the legal principle is morally wrong.   The
moral superiority of a principle that applies correct moral
principles with an exception for past mistakes may well
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counteract its ungainly ad hoc formulation.  In fact, if we take
Dworkin’s criteria for legal principles literally, it appears
that Heidi must formulate her legal principle this way, in order
to achieve the maximum of both fit and moral attractiveness.
We have addressed our arguments so far to Ronald Dworkin’s
account of legal principles, in which a judge constructs a legal
principle from the data of past decisions to resolve a current
dispute.  Suppose instead that we take a conventional view of
legal principles: legal principles are the decisional principles
generally agreed upon within the legal profession.76  Could such
a principle constrain judicial decisionmaking?  We do not think
so.
We note, first, that to count as legal principles,
conventional legal principles must operate as legal principles,
not as rules.  They must be organic rather than posited, changing
as the body of professional opinion changes.  Their content must
be governed at least in part by coherence with past decisions.   
They must influence future decisions by exerting weight, rather
than determine future decisions by prescribing results.77
The weight of a conventional legal principle, as well as its
content, is established by professional agreement.  There are two
ways to conceive of legal principles as products of convention. 
First, legal professionals might agree on the principles
themselves: legal principles, and their weights, are constituted
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by professional agreement.  We can reject this understanding
quickly.  If legal principles are posited by the profession - for
example, in judicial opinions or legal texts - they do not count
as legal principles, but as posited rules.  If, on the other
hand, they arise out of agreement alone, they are self-
referential.  Professional agreement cannot create a preexisting
principle, and if the principle does not predate professional
agreement, the profession cannot be agreeing upon the principle
but rather, must be generating it.  If the profession generates
the principle, it is, once again, a posited rule, not something
distinct.
Alternatively, legal professionals might agree, not directly
about the content of legal principles, but about how particular 
cases should be decided.  In that case, legal principles might be
conceived of as the best principles that conform to
particularized professional judgments.  The main difficulty with
this account of legal principles is that it depends on the
unlikely event of broad professional consensus.  To the extent
that professionals disagree about outcomes, there are no legal
principles.  A further problem is that when professionals do
agree on particular outcomes, it is not at all clear that their
agreement on outcomes reflects an agreement on legal principles
and their comparative weights.  Consensus about outcomes might
just as well follow from agreement on an unstated moral rule.  In
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other words, professional judgment about outcomes might be
shaped, not by institutional history (in the manner of a legal
principle) but by moral principles, including principles that
give moral weight to past decisions.
Pernicious Effects.  We have argued that judges cannot
reason from legal principles: legal principles are logically
incapable of imposing constraint.  At this point, we shall
suspend logic and assume both that past decisions shape legal
principles and legal principles affect the outcome of current
decisions.  Our argument here is that legal principles, if in
fact they are effective, can seriously impair the quality of
decisionmaking.
Our basic argument is simple.  Legal principles incorporate
moral error into law without the compensating benefits of serious
rules.  We have already explained that legal principles are
imperfect from a moral point of view because they must conform to
past decisions, some of which will be moral mistakes.  As a
result, they are inferior to ideal natural reasoning, which
perfectly reflects moral ideals.78
Rules too are morally imperfect.  They are based on moral
principles, but to guide decisions, they must generalize in ways
that lead to morally mistaken outcomes in some cases.  They may
also fall short of moral standards due to obsolescence or faulty
design.  Rules, however, compensate in several ways for the moral
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mistakes they produce.  They settle moral controversy, preempt
errors by individual decisionmakers, provide coordination, and
make decisionmaking more efficient.79
Legal principles provide none of these benefits.  Principles
whose content is determined by a standard of coherence with past
decisions may yield answers to legal questions, but they will not
yield unique answers because more than one principle may satisfy
the requirement of coherence.  Further, even if we assume that
morally incorrect legal principles can have weight and that
judges will not circumvent the requirement of fit through
creative use of exceptions, judges have considerable freedom in
reasoning from legal principles.  To formulate and apply a legal
principle, a judge must draw tentative principles from past
cases, determine which among eligible principles is morally best,
and assign weight to competing principles.  The risk that judges
will err as they proceed through these steps is at least a great
as the risk of error in natural reasoning.  The process of
decisionmaking under legal principles is just as complex as
natural reasoning, if not more so. Because judges may vary in the
legal principles they extrapolate from precedents and the moral
values that guide them in selecting principles and assigning them
weight,80 legal principles cannot provide the benefits of
coordination and will thus lead to further moral costs beyond
their incorporation of past errors.
49
Not only do legal principles fail to provide the benefits of
serious rules, they override rules.  According to some
descriptions at least, rules announced in prior opinions are
among the legal materials with which legal principles must be
made to fit.81  Once the threshold of fit has been passed,
however, rules can be discarded; and in any event precedent rules
do not prescribe results: they can only help to shape legal
principles.  In a regime of legal principles, therefore, there
can be no serious rules.
The Failure of Proposed Justifications for Legal Principles. 
Various normative arguments have been made on behalf of legal
principles; in our view, none succeed.  One such argument is that
reasoning from legal principles promotes equality or “integrity.” 
 The requirement of fit with past decisions means that past and
present litigants who are similarly situated (as defined by the
legal principle itself) will be treated alike.82  More generally,
legal principles drawn from past decisions provide judges with a
comprehensive set of decisional standards that unite the body of
law and reflect a “coherent conception of justice and fairness”
applicable to all parties in all cases.83
We have already explained why we reject like treatment of
litigants over time as a moral ideal.84  Legal cases are never
identical, and past opinions offer limited factual descriptions
that can filter out important differences.  More substantively,
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aside from the effects of justified reliance, morally incorrect
decisions in the past do not justify morally incorrect decisions
in the present and future.  Equality is theory-dependent: it
requires, if anything, that any given moral principle be applied
equally to all.  A lapse in the past is a cause for regret but
not for additional moral wrongs.
For those who are convinced that equal treatment among
litigants is a moral good even when governing moral principles
are misapplied, we suggest that legal principles are not a
reliable source of consistency in judicial decisionmaking.  Given
the variability of legal principles among judges and the
changeability of legal principles over time, past and present
litigants may not in fact be treated alike.  Serious rules at
least guarantee like treatment of all cases that fall within the
classes defined by a rule; legal principles are too unstable to
guarantee a similar level of consistency.  And, as we have noted,
legal principles makes serious rules impossible.
A second, related claim on behalf of legal principles is
that they avoid retroactivity.85  Natural and rule-based models
of law allow judges to make retroactive decisions, in the manner
of legislatures.  Natural reasoning does not rely on predefined
standards of decision and legal rules apply only to the classes
of cases that fall within their terms; in any other case, the
judge must decide what is best, all things considered, or
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formulate a new rule and apply it to events that occurred before
the announcement of the rule.  Legal principles, in contrast,
“exist” prior to their application to particular cases, as the
morally best principles that explain the body of decisions to
date.  They are capable of resolving all possible disputes,
because coherence with the past supplies a decisional standard
for new cases.  It follows, according to this claim, that when
judges decide cases on the basis of legal principles, they are
enforcing preexisting rights of the parties.
This argument for legal principle fails on several grounds. 
First, natural decisionmaking, including natural decisionmaking
in the interstices of legal rules, takes account of the moral
concerns that make retroactivity a problem.  Judges reasoning
naturally can and must consider the effects of their decisions on
justified expectations of the parties and other actors.86  
Second, it is not so clear that legal principles preexist
particular decisions in a way that matters morally.  As we
explained in comparing legal principles with rules, legal
principles are indeterminate in several ways.87  Indeterminacy
means, in turn, that the prior “existence” of legal principles is
no guaranty against unfair surprise.
Moreover, as Ken Kress has shown, the content of legal
principles changes over time.88  Legal principles, at least as
defined by Dworkin, are the morally best principles that pass a
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threshold of fit with prior decisions.  Assuming that judges do
not simply combine correct moral principles with exceptions for
past cases, and assuming that the set of past decisions includes
some mistakes, the best available legal principle will always be
a principle that fits the minimum allowable number of past
decisions.  Beyond this threshold, judges will discard mistaken
precedents in order to formulate morally preferable principles. 
Meanwhile, new decisions, are constantly entering the body of
law.  As this occurs, judges will discard more past mistakes, new
mistakes will need to be accounted for, and legal principles will
change accordingly.  Legal principles, in other words, are
organic rather than fixed, and it is impossible to predict with
confidence their content at any time.  As Kress demonstrates,
they may even change between the time of the disputed transaction
and the time the dispute is adjudicated, thus resulting in
retroactivity.  In other words, reasoning from legal principles
may be less rather than more capable of avoiding pernicious
retroactivity than natural reasoning on the rule model.
Summary: Why Legal Principles Do Not and Should Not Have a
Role in Judicial Decisionmaking.  For many lawyers, the idea of
legal principles seems to capture an important part of legal
reasoning.  As a matter of logic, however, legal principles
cannot operate in the way their proponents suggest, as a medium
by which past decisions constrain the outcome of natural
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reasoning in current cases.  The notion of weight is too elusive,
and the criterion of fit with prior decisions is too malleable,
to sustain the argument that legal principles guide judges in
reaching decisions.
Perhaps if judges took the requirement of fit very seriously
- legal principles must explain all prior decisions without
resort to awkward exceptions - past decisions would exert some
(vague) power over current outcomes.  The effect, however, would
be pernicious: legal principles would entrench past errors
without securing the benefits associated with legal rules.  In
any event, coherence would eventually break down under a strict
standard of fit.  Not surprisingly therefore, proponents of legal
principles do not support a standard of this kind. 
Accordingly, we eliminate from our account of legal
reasoning the entire apparatus of legal principles.  To the
extent that analogical reasoning rests on similarities identified
by reference to legal principles, we also exclude analogical
reasoning from our account.  In the next chapter, we suggest that
the process of drawing analogies and searching past decisions for
evidence of principles may have a practical function for judges. 
But legal principles, and analogies based on legal principles, do
not determine the outcomes of cases.  Judges who purport to
reason on this basis are either reasoning naturally under the
guise of legal principles or reasoning deductively from
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informally posited rules. 
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1Chapter Four: Common Law Practice
In our analysis of the common law, we have taken argued that
judges resolving legal disputes reason in the ways that all
decisionmakers reason.  They reason naturally, drawing moral and
empirical conclusions through induction and the method of
reflective equilibrium, and they reason deductively from
authoritative rules.  Natural reasoning is unconstrained by law;
deductive reasoning is constrained by legal rules that preempt
natural reasoning.  Other methods of decisionmaking popularly
attributed to judges, including analogical reasoning from case to
case and reasoning from legal principles, are illusory.  Judges
may appear to do these things, but analogies and legal principles
impose no actual constraint on judicial reasoning.  The outcome
of purportedly analogical processes rests in fact on natural or
deductive reasoning.
We have also suggested that the common law will be most
effective, both in correctly resolving particular disputes and in
settling future controversies, if current judges treat rules
established by prior judges as binding in a preemptive sense. 
This model of judicial decisionmaking, which we have called the
rule model, entails that judges have rulemaking authority.  In
Chapter Two, we addressed some of the theoretical questions that
arise when judges act as rulemakers, including the scope of their
2rulemaking authority, preconditions for establishment of binding
precedent rules, and overruling of precedent rules.1  In the
present chapter, we consider some practical objections to the
rule model, both as a prescription for judicial decisionmaking
and as a description of judicial practice.
The most significant difficulty facing the rule model as a
prescription for decisionmaking is that judges may not be good
rulemakers.  Our argument for the superiority of the rule model
of judicial decisionmaking over unconstrained natural reasoning
depends on the quality of judicial rules.  Deduction from
precedent rules can improve on natural reasoning only if rules
prevent more error by preempting faulty reasoning, coordinating
conduct, and simplifying decisionmaking, than they cause by
prescribing the wrong result in particular cases.
Precedent rules can be faulty in several ways.  Most
obviously, rules may be substantively misconceived: they may
serve inappropriate ends, or the means they select may be inapt. 
Alternatively, rules may be formally defective.  Rules may be so
blunt that errors of overinclusiveness exceed the errors that
would result from unconstrained reasoning and lack of
coordination.  Overinclusiveness is an unavoidable byproduct of
the qualities of generality and determinateness that make rules
effective; at some point, however, it goes too far.2   Precedent
rules may also be overly complex: if rules are too confusing,
3judges and actors may err so frequently in applying them that
actual outcomes will not be superior to the outcomes of natural
reasoning.3  Another possibility is that rules may be too vague
and indeterminate to preempt natural reasoning, or may generate
interpretive controversies that are just as costly as the moral
controversies the rules were designed to settle.4
Whether any given judicial rule meets the standard of net
error reduction is, ultimately, an empirical question.  Certain
features of the environment in which judges announce rules,
however, give cause for concern about the quality of judicial
rules.  Under the rule model of judicial decisionmaking, judges
are not only rulemakers but also adjudicators.  For reasons we
outline below, the demands and distractions of adjudication
create a special risk of suboptimal rules. 
Our argument for the rule model of judicial decisionmaking
can also be challenged on descriptive grounds: judges and lawyers
behave in ways that appear to contradict both the rule model of
decisionmaking and our more general conclusion that judicial
reasoning consists of nothing more than ordinary moral,
inductive, and deductive reasoning.  The rule model assumes that
judicial decisions are constrained only by posited rules; yet
judges claim to be guided by factual analogies to prior cases,
and lawyers regularly present analogies to judges as a source of
persuasion.5  The rule model assumes that judges have plenary
4authority to make rules; yet, to the extent judges announce rules
at all, they typically confine themselves to narrow rules
tailored to the dispute before them.6  When precedent judges do
issue rules that go beyond the needs of adjudication, future
judges may disregard the rules as dicta.7  The rule model permits
overruling but does not recognize the practice of distinguishing
rules; in contrast, judges typically are reluctant to overrule
precedents but frequently claim to distinguish precedent rules.8
In the sections that follow, we raise the possibility that
various conventions traditionally associated with the common law
may help to counteract the disadvantages judges face as
rulemakers.  The conventions we consider do not ensure that
judges will adopt sound precedent rules, but they serve,
indirectly, to neutralize some predictable sources of error.  If
in fact conventional practices can improve the quality of
judicial rules, they place the rule model on a sounder practical
footing.  Further, the possibility that conventional practices
assist judges in designing sound rules helps to explain the
descriptive gaps between the rule model and actual judicial
behavior.  Practices that appear to contradict the rule model of
decisionmaking may have developed in response to the special
problems that arise when a single authority must both resolve a
particular dispute and also announce rules for a broader class of
future cases.
5The picture of common law in action we present in this
chapter is far from ideal.  The practices we describe are not
direct, rational responses to the deficiencies of judicial
rulemaking, but rather are customary practices that counteract
those deficiencies in a rough and indirect way.  Because they
depend on professional custom, they are also potentially
unstable.  Yet the capacity of these practices to improve the
quality of judicial rules may explain why seemingly illogical
methods of decision and argumentation occupy a central place in
legal training and convention and also why the common law appears
to have evolved more sensibly over time than its circumstances
might predict.
Judges as Rulemakers
The rule model of the common law, in which precedent rules
are binding on later judges, is defensible only if precedent
rules prevent more error than they cause.  Judicial rules need
not perfectly translate moral principles into concrete
prescriptions, but they must be sufficiently well designed that
judges will do a better job of implementing moral principles by
following precedent rules than by reasoning without constraint.9  
All rules - judicial or legislative - must meet this standard to
be justified as rules.  Judges, however, must combine the task of
rulemaking with the task of adjudication.  As a result, they face
6special difficulties in designing rules that will bring about a
net reduction in error.
Inattention.  The first impediment to sound judicial
rulemaking is that judges tend to treat rulemaking as incidental
to adjudication.  For much of the history of English and American
common law, judges were reluctant to acknowledge their role as
lawmakers.  Creating law was the province of legislatures; the
role of judges was to resolve disputes according to previously
established law.10  In the absence of positive (legislated) law,
judicial decisions were governed by the common law, but the
common law was viewed as an independent body of norms located in
custom and “reason” rather than judicial opinions.11  Because
judges were both  learned in both legal custom and experienced in
the application of reason, their statements and decisions served
as evidence of law.  But they had no personal authority to make
law by announcing rules: they merely discovered and applied the
law.12
This view of the matter did not deter early courts from
developing a comprehensive body of law, but it prevented them
from acknowledging lawmaking as an equal part of their work.13  
Modern judges, recognizing that their opinions affect conduct,
are quicker to admit that they can and do create law, and some
are quite explicit about announcing rules to govern future
cases.14  Yet for most courts, rulemaking continues to be a
7secondary concern: the immediate need is to resolve a dispute.  
As a result, judges are likely to announce rules more
casually than legislatures, with less attention to the full range
of the rules’ consequences.  Heidi, drafting an opinion in the
case of Edward’s bear, might state that “wild animals in
residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se;” therefore, the
bear must go.  Because her attention is focused on explaining why
she has decided against Edward, she may not pause to consider the
breadth of the rule, which by its terms bans not only bears but
also field mice and other odd but harmless pets.
Of course, Heidi’s statement may not in fact amount to a
rule.  As we understand the nature of authoritative rules, if
Heidi did not intend to announce a rule, no precedent rule
exists.15  In that case, no harm is done.  Yet it is also
possible that Heidi meant to state a rule justifying her decision
but formulated the rule in haste without thinking systematically
about future cases.  If so, the result is an authoritative, but
suboptimal, rule.
This is not to suggest that legislatures are impeccable
rulemakers.  For a variety of reasons, they too are capable of
enacting poor rules.  Legislatures, however, are at least more
likely to view future governance as a central part of their
project.
Cognitive Bias.  A second difficulty is that even when
8judges turn their full attention to rulemaking, the facts of the
dispute before them may distort their reasoning about rules.  In
the developing field of behavioral decision theory, cognitive
psychologists have demonstrated that human decisionmakers rely on
a variety of “heuristics” - cognitive shortcuts - to reach
empirical conclusions.16  These heuristics are useful because
they allow people to form judgments with confidence under
conditions of complexity and uncertainty.  Yet because cognitive
heuristics replace full unbiased reasoning with simpler indirect
decisional strategies, they can also lead the reasoner into
error.17
Judges, like all human reasoners, are subject to errors of
this kind.  Cognitive heuristics can affect the accuracy of
judicial factfinding.  For example, well-documented biases can
lead judges (and juries) to err in calculating probabilities,18
determining causation and responsibility,19 judging the
foreseeability of past events,20 fixing damage awards,21
evaluating settlements,22 estimating the chance of reversal on
appeal,23 and assessing the merits of appeals.24
More important for our purposes, cognitive biases can affect
the design of judicial rules.  When the facts of a particular
dispute are prominent in a rulemaker’s mind, certain certain
heuristics are especially likely to come into play and to cause
the rulemaker to miscalculate the future effects of rules. 
9Accordingly, as Frederick Schauer has observed, there is reason
to doubt the common assumption that judicial rules benefit from
the concrete factual settings in which judges work.25  Concrete
facts may give judges a sense of rules in action, but they also
can distort judicial analysis of the consequences of rules across
the range of cases to which they apply.
The cognitive heuristic that bears most directly on the
rulemaking in the context of adjudication is “availability.”26 
In judging the frequency or probability of events, decisionmakers
tend to assume that the events that come most easily to mind are
also the most likely to occur.  This assumption can work fairly
well as a time-saving rule of thumb, but it can also lead the
reasoner to overlook statistical probabilities. 
When a judge formulates a rule for future cases, the facts
of the case currently pending are easy to recall, while other
potential applications of the rule are distant and possibly
unknown to the judge.  As a result, the current case may appear
more representative than it is of the class of cases covered by
the rule, and the court may announce a faulty rule.  For example:
Heidi is considering the case of Martha, whose mean-tempered pit
bull recently attacked a neighbor.  With Martha’s pit bull in
mind, Heidi formulates a rule, “pit bulls in residential
neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”  Martha’s dog, however, may
not be typical.  If, in fact, most pit bulls are docile, this
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rule may cause more errors that it prevents.
Another heuristic likely to affect judges in their dual
capacity as rulemakers and adjudicators is “affect.”27 
Particular images may evoke positive or negative emotions in
reasoners, based on the reasoner’s experience.  As a cognitive
heuristic, affect manifests itself in a number of ways.  The most
pertinent for our purposes is that decisionmakers give more
weight to information that translates easily into emotionally
charged images than to information that does not produce a ready
affective response.  Thus, people take risks more seriously when
the risk is presented as a frequency (1 in 10) than when it is
presented as a probability (10%).  The reason for this,
presumably, is that frequency information refers to instances and
is therefore more likely to raise specific images in the
decisionmakers’s mind.  When risk information is presented in
narrative form, the response is stronger still.28
Like the availability heuristic, the affect heuristic
suggests that in formulating rules, judges may give greater
weight to the facts of the cases they are currently adjudicating
than to other cases that might fall within the terms of the rule. 
The case at hand provides a ready-made set of images, often
presented in a manner calculated to invoke the adjudicator’s
emotions.  As a result, it may command the judge’s attention in a
way that statistical information about the class of cases
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governed by the rule does not.  The picture of Martha’s pit bull
mauling a child may lead Heidi to adopt the wrong nuisance rule. 
Legislators can be influenced by affect and availability as well,
as when they act in response to events that have engaged public
emotions.  In the case of judges, however, vivid images that are
likely to provoke an affective response are a regular feature of
the rulemaking environment.
Another possibly relevant heuristic is “anchoring.”29  In
assessing value or probability, decisionmakers may be influenced
by particular numbers or instances that have been brought to
their attention, even if those numbers or instances are not
typical.  For example: Heidi is considering whether to announce a
rule that pits bulls in residential neighborhoods are nuisances
per se.  A pertinent question is what percentage of pit bulls are
dangerously aggressive.  The plaintiffs in Martha’s case have
shown that Martha owns four pet pit bulls, two of which have
attacked children or dogs in the neighborhood (50%).   Heidi
knows that Martha trained her dogs to act as watch dogs and that
she should, accordingly, adjust her estimate of the general
aggressiveness of pit bulls downward from 50%.  Yet, in the
absence of further evidence (which neither party has much reason
to present), the anchoring heuristic suggests that Heidi will not
adjust sufficiently from the initial figure suggested by the
facts.
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There are other possibilities.  Research suggests that
decisionmakers handle statistical calculations more accurately
when they understand that they are assessing a series of cases
(how often do pit bulls bite?) than when they focus on a single
event (how likely was it that Martha’s pit bull would bite?).30 
Perceptions may be distorted by a sense of contrast when
decisonmakers begin with a single observation (compared to
Martha’s pit bull, airedales may appear safer than they are).31 
Decisionmakers who observe the actions of others, as judges do in
deciding cases, tend to attribute causal responsibility to
personal traits of the actor rather than background conditions
because the actor is more salient (a pit bull may appear
aggressive when in fact it is suffering from indigestion).32
Adjudication may have some positive effects on judicial
cognition as well.  Affect and examples appear to facilitate and
clarify decisionmaking in some situations.33  Focusing on a
specific set of facts may also lead judges to announce narrower
rules, which, while not necessarily optimal, will at least cause
less damage if they turn out to have been misconceived.34 
Overall, however, the special salience of a pending dispute in
the mind of the judge seems likely to interfere with, rather than
enhance, the reasoning needed to design sound rules for future
cases.35
Overruling Problems.  The rule model of judicial
13
decisionmaking assumes that judges have authority not only to
make precedent rules but also to overrule them.36  At the same
time, the rule model does not and cannot distinguish between
overruling precedent rules and modifying or “distinguishing”
them.37  When a judge makes an exception to a rule to accommodate
a particular case, the judge is effectively eliminating the
precedent rule and announcing a new rule in its place.
As we explained in Chapter Two, judges ideally should
overrule precedent rules only when they are unjustified or
suboptimal as rules.  More precisely, judges should overrule
either when, due to obsolescence or poor design, a precedent rule
is likely to cause more erroneous results than it prevents over
the range of cases to which it applies, or when an alternative
rule would prevent more error or cause less error than the
precedent rule, and the likely benefits from error reduction
exceed the costs of the disruption likely to follow from
overruling the precedent.  At the same time, judges must bear in
mind that rules can be both justified and optimal as rules -
likely to reduce the sum of error over the range of their
application and preferable to any alternative - and yet prescribe
the wrong result in certain cases.  When a generally sound rule
appears to require an erroneous result, courts should not
overrule; they should treat the rule as a serious rule and follow
it without second-guessing what it prescribes.38
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As Schauer points out, judges may not succeed in overruling
precedent rules when and only when they should.39  One problem is
the overruling standard itself.  The rule model requires that, as
adjudicators, judges must follow precedent rules without regard
to the moral justification of the results those rules prescribe
in particular cases.  As makers and abrogators of rules, however,
judges can and should evaluate the overall moral justification of
rules before determining whether to retain them or to overrule
them.  This is a fine line for judges to walk.  If they fail to
make the distinction between erroneous outcomes and unjustified
or suboptimal rules, they may either upset settlements by
overruling sound rules to accommodate the supposed “equities” of
particular cases or entrench error by retaining defective rules.
The first problem - precipitous overruling - is aggravated
by the same cognitive heuristics that affect the design of
precedent rules, particularly the tendency to assume that readily
recalled facts or affectively charged images are representative
of the larger classes to which they belong.40  For example: Heidi
is considering the case of Sally, who keeps a well-trained,
amiable pit pull in her home.  In a previous nuisance case, a
judge announced the rule that “pit bulls in residential
neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”  Assume this rule is sound:
a rule excluding all pit bulls will produce more correct
decisions overall, and greater coordination benefits, than case-
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by-case prediction of the probable behavior of particular pit
bulls.  When Heidi assesses this rule, however, the picture most
likely to come to mind is Sally’s well-mannered dog. 
Particularly if the image of Sally and her pet evokes a positive
emotional response, the facts of the case are likely to have a
greater effect on Heidi’s deliberations than more abstract
information such as the statistical likelihood of pit bull
attacks and the coordination value of an unqualified no-pit-bull
rule.41  As a result, Heidi may be tempted to overrule the
precedent rule or modify it to allow owners of well-trained pit
bulls to keep their pets.  If the rule in its existing form is
the best rule for future pit bull disputes, this will be an
error: cognitive bias triggered by the adjudicatory setting will
have led Heidi to mistake a single regrettable outcome for lack
of overall justification for the rule.
As Schauer has noted, the second problem - failure to
overrule rules that are suboptimal or unjustified as rules - is
exacerbated by case selection effects.42  Judges address
precedent rules only when the rules are challenged by parties to
a dispute.  When the law governing a dispute is clear, however,
parties are likely to settle rather than bring their case to
court.43  It follows that judges may not often preside over cases
that involve core applications of a precedent rule.  Trials and
appeals become more likely when the rule’s application to
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particular facts is indeterminate.44  In cases of indeterminacy,
however, the judge can avoid allegedly infelicitous applications
of the rule by interpreting the rule narrowly so as to avoid
those applications, leaving the rule as so interpreted full in
effect.  Thus, judges may have few opportunities to assess the
everyday application of rules that are obsolete or misconceived. 
A particularly harsh application may give the party opposing the
rule hope for an exception, but, as we have noted, a harsh
application does not necessarily indicate that the rule itself is
unsound. 
Summary: Why Judges Are Poor Rulemakers.  The rule model of
judicial decisionmaking casts judges as both rulemakers and
adjudicators.  The dual role that judges perform in the legal
process is likely to affect the quality of judicial rules in
several ways.  The demands of adjudication, together with
traditions and political pressures that relegate rulemaking to a
secondary position, can lead judges to pay less attention than
they should to the potential consequences of their rules. 
Cognitive heuristics, triggered by attention to particular facts,
can lead to miscalculation or disregard of the consequences of
rules.  Adjudication may also have adverse effects on judicial
oversight of precedent rules.
This is not to say that legislation is clearly superior to
common law as a source of settlement.  Moral and empirical
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deliberation by elected representatives is notoriously subject to
interest group politics and collective action problems, in
addition to cognitive biases and ordinary reasoning errors.45  We
are not equipped to undertake a full comparison of judicial and
legislative rulemaking; we note only that there is reason to
believe Schauer is correct in his observation that the need to
resolve a particular dispute hinders rather than helps judges in
producing sound precedent rules.  “Cases make bad rules.”46
Correctives to Judicial Rulemaking
Because judges announce rules in the course of resolving
particular disputes, they face impediments in designing sound
rules.  The risk of poor quality rules challenges the key
assumption of the rule model of judicial decisionmaking - the
assumption that following precedent rules will reduce the sum of
error.  The prospects for effective common law, however, may not
be as bleak as our analysis so far suggests.  In the sections
that follow, we suggest that some aspects of traditional common-
law decisionmaking - practices and norms that we find difficult
to explain on any other ground - may work to improve the quality
of judicial rules.  We make this suggestion cautiously: the
practices we have in mind do not address the problems of judicial
rulemaking directly, and the correctives they provide are partial
at best.
18
The Method of Analogy.  We have argued that so-called
analogical reasoning does not contribute in a meaningful way to
judicial decisionmaking.47  The outcome of one case, without
more, carries no logical implications for the outcome of another
case.  Nor do past decisions constrain decisionmaking through the
device of “legal principles.”48  Our analysis of the notion of
legal principles (in its best-known and most attractive form)
suggests that past decisions do not generate legal principles,
and that if they could, legal principles would in any event have
no real impact on current decisions.  Further, if past decisions
could constrain the content of legal principles, and legal
principles could constrain the outcome of current cases, they
would do so only at the cost of entrenching error.  If we are
correct that analogical reasoning and reasoning from legal
principles are spurious constraints, it follows that the only
viable forms of legal reasoning are natural moral and empirical
reasoning and deduction from rules.
The analogical methods practiced by judges and lawyers may
nevertheless have a positive influence on legal rules.  The most
serious impediment to sound judicial rulemaking is the
possibility that a particular set of facts will have inordinate
influence on the judge’s deliberations about rules.49  Reacting
to evidence that Martha’s pit bull recently attacked a child,
Heidi may respond too quickly with a rule: “pit bulls in
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residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”
 Seeking analogies in prior cases widens the judge’s
perspective by bringing alternative sets of fact to mind.  This
in turn reduces the risk of bias in rulemaking.  If the judge
proceeds to formulate a rule, exposure to additional facts makes
it less likely that the judge will assume the pending case is
representative of the larger class of cases covered by the
rule.50
 Thus: in the case of Martha’s pit bull, Heidi, aided by
lawyers, will pause to review past nuisance cases involving dogs. 
Assume she finds two cases in which courts allowed owners to keep
docile pit bulls, one in which a court ordered an owner to give
up a German shepherd that bit a landscaper, and another in which
the court allowed an owner to keep a very large sheepdog with no
history of aggressive behavior.  After consulting these cases,
Heidi may adjust her position and conclude that breeds are not
the most accurate criteria for judging when dogs are nuisances. 
She may choose instead to issue a narrower rule (“attack-trained
pit bulls are nuisances”), a different rule (“dogs that have
previously engaged in aggressive behavior are nuisances”), or no
rule at all.
The benefits of analogical methodology are indirect.  
Analogies to past decisions do not constrain the content of
judicial rules, any more than they constrain the outcome of
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adjudication.  Instead, the process of searching for analogies
and comparing cases dilutes the impact of the pending dispute and
places the judges in a better position to seek reflective
equilibrium before announcing a rule.  After scanning an array of
factual settings, the judge is in a better position to test the
application of possible rules.  Actual evidence in the pending
case may be more vivid than descriptions of facts in past
opinions, but the images it presents are no longer unopposed.
Ideally, the notion of analogy would not be necessary. 
Judges would test potential rules against examples drawn from
past cases and from other legal and extra-legal sources as well
in the course of natural reasoning about rules.51  Analogy enters
in because, in practice, time pressure and preoccupation with the
task of adjudication are likely to cut the process of
deliberation short.  The widely accepted belief that analogies
can and should guide judicial decisionmaking leads judges to
study a broader array of factual possibilities than they
otherwise likely would.
To some extent, the rule model of decisionmaking itself may
enlarge the perspective of judges.  Judges operating under the
rule model will come into contact with past decisions as they
search for precedent rules.  Analogical methods, however, are
likely to be more effective because they require the judge to
engage with the facts of prior cases, make comparisons, and
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formulate rules that explain the importance or unimportance of
common facts.  Analogical techniques are also broader in scope. 
All cases are potentially “governed” by analogy, while precedent
rules cover only those cases that fall within their stated terms. 
Accordingly, the search for analogies continues even if the court
is satisfied that no rule applies.
Analogical methods are not without risks.  A judges who
believes that analogies in themselves provide a ground for
decision may decide on the basis of an unexplained intuition of
similarity.52  Thus, Heidi might conclude that Martha’s pit bull
is “like” a German shepherd.   Alternatively, the judge may
construct a “legal principle” based largely on fit with prior
cases, and in doing so entrench past mistakes.53  If Martha’s pit
bull, unlike the pit bulls in prior cases, is a French pit bull,
Heidi might decide according to the principle that “European
guard dogs are nuisances in residential neighborhoods.”)  
Restrictions on the Scope of Precedent Rules.  If judges are
not good rulemakers, it follows that they should be cautious in
announcing rules.  Ideally, they should avoid rulemaking only
when bias affects their judgment; but cognitive bias, by its
nature, is difficult for the reasoner to detect and cure.  As a
fallback, the safest course for judges may be to minimize the
impact of unsound precedent rules by limiting the scope of all
precedent rules.
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Established conventions restrict judicial rulemaking in
several ways.  We noted in Chapter Two that, in announcing
precedent rules, judges typically confine themselves to rules
that provide an answer to the dispute before the court.54  In a
dispute over Edward’s bear, Heidi will stop short of announcing a
rule about lawnmowing in residential neighborhoods, even if her
research on the subject of nuisances has convinced her that a
lawnmowing rule would be beneficial.  Judicial restraint in
promulgating rules is reinforced by prevailing methods of
interpreting prior opinions.  Later judges typically characterize
statements that are not necessary to explain the result of the
prior case as non-binding “dicta,” even if they take the form of
rules.55  Thus, if Heidi states in her opinion in Edward’s case
that residential landowners must mow their lawns on Saturday,
future judges will feel free to regard her statement as a stray
remark or at best a suggestion.
These limits on judicial rulemaking are not entailed by the
rule model, which confers rulemaking authority on judges without
qualification.56  Limits of this kinds, however, may be sensible
responses to the problems judicial rulemaking encounters.  A
self-imposed restraint against rulemaking on subjects that are
unrelated to the dispute at hand tends to result in narrow rules
and cautious development of common law.
Analogical methods can have a similar conservative effect on
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judicial rules.  We have argued that reasoning by analogy (as
opposed to purely intuitive analogical decisionmaking) amounts to
formulating and applying rules that support like treatment of
cases.57  Connections between the facts of past and present cases
are easiest to see and articulate at a low level of generality;
therefore, analogy-warranting rules tend to be modest and
concrete.58  For example: Heidi determines that Karl’s ocelot is
importantly similar to Edward’s bear, which a prior judge held to
be a nuisance.  She explains the likeness of the cases by
reference to a rule: “dangerous wild animals in residential
neighborhoods are nuisances.”  The same moral principles that
justify this rule might also justify a broader rule: “potentially
dangerous agents that are difficult to control are nuisances when
maintained in an area where they might cause serious personal
injury.”  This rule, however, does not capture the link between
Karl’s ocelot and Edward’s bear as effectively as the narrower
dangerous-wild-animal rule.  The broader rules also calls for a
much wider search of prior cases to test the rule against
outcomes within its range.59  Therefore, Heidi is likely to
choose the narrower form.  If the resulting rule is unsound, the
harm it causes will be correspondingly small.
Distinguishing and Overruling.  The rule model of judicial
decisionmaking has no conceptual room for the practice of
distinguishing rules.  Precedent rules are serious rules, meaning
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that judges must either follow them according to their terms,
without reference to the underlying moral principles they are
designed to implement, or overrule them.  At the same time, the
rule model itself does not limit the power to overrule: judges
have authority to make rules, and therefore judges have authority
to replace or eliminate rules.  Ideally, judges will overrule
precedent rules only when the existing rule is either unjustified
or suboptimal as a rule - that is, when it causes more error than
it prevents or performs less well than an alternative rule - and
only when the harm to expectations and coordination from
overruling or the prospect of overruling does not militate in
favor of retaining a suboptimal rule.60  When sound rules appear
to prescribe mistaken results, judges should leave them in place
and decide as they require.
As we have noted, however, the ideal standard for
overruling, as just described, is difficult if not impossible for
judges to apply.  Unjustified rules are logically distinct from
justified rules that produce erroneous outcomes; psychologically,
however, it is hard to separate the two.  Cognitive heuristics
exacerbate the problem: the availability and affective power of
live parties and narrative facts will illuminate an unappealing
outcome in the case before the court and obscure the more
abstract benefits of upholding a sound rule.61  An artificial
presumption in favor of rule-following might counteract the
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effects of compelling facts, but applying such a presumption is
not rational.  Why should a judge follow a precedent rule when
the judge believes the balance favors overruling?
The stance that judges traditionally have taken toward
precedent rules is rather different from what the rule model
recommends.  Judges tend to be cautious in overruling precedent
rules; at least, they do not repeal rules at will in the manner
of a legislature.  On the other hand, they commonly distinguish
precedent rules, carving out exceptions based on factual
differences between the current case and past cases in which the
rule was applied.62
As we have said, distinguishing is not a form of partial
rule-following.  For the reasons outlined in Chapter Three, when
a judge distinguishes a precedent rule, that rule has no impact
on the outcome of the pending case or the content of the
“modified” rule.  Nor do the facts of prior cases applying the
rule constrain the outcome of the pending case.  Distinguishing
is based on factual disanalogies that, like analogies, have no
independent rational force.  Either disanalogies are purely
intuitive, or they stem from a rule that identifies important
differences among cases.  Ultimately, therefore, there is no
constraint on the ability of judges to distinguish rules if
distinguishing is permitted: distinguishing rules is logically
equivalent to repealing rules at will.63 
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As a practice, however, distinguishing differs in one
important way from simple overruling of precedent rules.  Before
distinguishing a rule, the judge studies and compares the facts
of past cases applying the rule.  In the process, the judge is
likely to encounter at least one and probably more than one
concrete example in which the rule performed well.  Just as
seeking analogies helps judges assess the consequences of rules
beyond a single case, the practice of distinguishing may enable
judges to perceive more easily the benefits of adhering to
precedent rules.
For example: Heidi is considering the case of Edward’s bear. 
A prior opinion, in a nuisance suit against Walter, announced the
rule that “bears in residential neighborhoods are nuisances per
se.”  Heidi believes that the purposes of this rule do not apply
to Edward’s bear, a gentle retired circus animal that has lived
uneventfully in Edward’s home for years.  So she sets about
distinguishing Edward’s case.  To do this, she reads descriptions
of facts provided by the judge in Walter’s case: Walter’s pet
bear escaped and wandered into a school cafeteria, frightening
children and teachers.  She also consults the description of
facts in a later case that applied the no-bear rule in a nuisance
action against Charles: Charles’s bear, which had previously been
well-behaved, clawed a representative of a charitable
organization canvassing door-to door.  At this point, Heidi is
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still free to distinguish Edward’s case: Edward may keep his bear
in an especially sturdy cage, and Walter’s and Charles’s bears 
may never have worked in the circus.  But the facts of the prior
cases provide competing narratives that demonstrate the value of
an unqualified no-bear rule in a manner that is more likely to
influence Heidi’s deliberations than abstract arguments about
error prevention and coordination.  As a result, Heidi may be
less tempted to distinguish (and thereby overrule) the rule.
The practice of distinguishing precedent rules is dangerous
to the stability of rules because it creates an illusion of
modesty.  Judges may intervene more often when they believe they
are merely modifying, rather than overruling, established rules. 
Yet, if judges cannot reliably separate faulty rules from
regrettable outcomes, a set of conventions by which judges
hesitate to “overrule” but are willing to “distinguish” may be
the next-best solution.  Erroneous rules are not permanently
entrenched, but judges normally will not overrule rules without
first consulting examples that counteract the tendency to
overrule in response to engaging facts.
Summary: Corrective Practices.  Judges traditionally have
engaged in a number of practices that are not required by the
rule model of the common law and in some cases appear to
contradict either the rule model itself or the related assumption
that judicial reasoning is nothing other than ordinary moral and
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empirical reasoning and deduction from rules.  Judges seek
analogies; they avoid rules that are not necessary to the outcome
of a pending case and dismiss unnecessary rules as dicta; they
purport to distinguish precedent rules based on factual
differences among cases.  In our view, these practices do not
embody a special form of legal reasoning: apart from their effect
in narrowing the pool of eligible precedent rules, they do not
determine the outcomes of judicial decisionmaking.  They become
more understandable, however, when viewed as indirect strategies
that counteract the disadvantages of judges as rulemakers.   The
task of adjudication can lead judges to formulate rules
infelicitously; the practices we have described may serve,
partially and imperfectly, to correct the effects of adjudication
on rulemaking.
We offer this suggestion cautiously.  The potential benefits
we have attributed to otherwise mysterious judicial practices are
possibilities, not empirically verified and not without
accompanying risks to the stability of precedent rules.  If our
speculations are correct, however, the relationship between these
practices and judicial rulemaking helps to reconcile the rule
model of decisionmaking with the conventional behavior of lawyers
and judges. 
Rationality and Sustainability of Judicial Practice
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Certain conventional judicial practices - seeking analogies
with past decisions, avoiding or disregarding rules that are not
necessary to the outcome of a pending case, and distinguishing
precedent rules - may help to improve the quality of judicial
rules or limit the damage done by rules that are infelicitous. 
We have already noted several concerns about these practices. 
Analogical methods invite intuitive judgment and, to the extent
they constrain judicial decisionmaking, can entrench error. 
Restrictions on the scope of precedent rules limit the
opportunity for settlement.  Distinguishing precedent rules,
which is really overruling precedent rules, can undermine the
settlement value of existing rules.
Apart from these potential adverse consequences, the
conventional practices we have mentioned suffer from two problems
of a deeper kind.  First, although their most plausible virtues
lie in their capacity to prevent or contain the errors of
judicial rulemaking, this is not why judges pursue them.  Judges
engage in these practices because they believe they are the best
way to decide cases.  In other words, judges have, in a sense,
tricked themselves into adopting what might well be good
rulemaking habits.  This state of affairs is hard to reconcile
with the ideal of legal decisionmaking as a publicly accessible
process based on reason.
The element of unreason is most evident in the case of
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analogical decisionmaking: judges deciding by analogy purport to
resolve disputes on grounds that are logically unavailable.  
Conventions that restrict judicial rulemaking to rules that
explain the outcome of adjudication are more straightforward, but
they treat a cautionary strategy as a limit on judicial power. 
The practice of distinguishing precedent rules disguises
overruling as something more modest.  In each case, the practice
in question is justifiable, if at all, for reasons of which
practioners are unaware.
Indirection and self-deception are common enough in law.64 
Rules themselves illustrate this point.  As we noted in Chapter
One, legal rules serve moral values indirectly.  Rules reduce the
errors of natural reasoning by prescribing answers in a form that
will sometimes yield the wrong results.  As a consequence,
following rules means acting against the balance of reasons in
some cases.  Acting against the balance of reasons is not
rational.  Therefore, to accept the authority of rules, one must
convince oneself that following the rule is the right thing to do
in every case, even though it is not.65  Self-deception of this
kind allows rules to perform the morally valuable function of
settling controversy, but it is nevertheless disturbing.  Any
departure from reasoned decisionmaking, even if justifiable on
reasoned grounds, is a cause for regret.
More practically, because the conventional judicial
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practices we have described involve self-deception and
irrationality, they are also unstable.  If lawyers and judges
come to understand that conventional practices are not rationally
defensible on their own terms, they may cease to accept those
practices, and whatever benefits conventional practices hold for
rulemaking will be lost.  Analogical reasoning appears to be
firmly established at present: our critical analysis of
analogical methods is not likely to prevail over pervasive legal
training and professional acceptance.  Careful factual
comparisons, however, may eventually give way to quicker work-
based searches for applicable rules.66  Judicial diffidence in
rulemaking may be more vulnerable, as judges come to accept that
they possess a full complement of rulemaking power.  There are
also indications that courts have become more comfortable with
direct overruling of precedent rules, and therefore may be less
likely to search past cases for distinguishing facts.67
The common law, therefore, stands on movable ground.  The
rule model of judicial decisionmaking, which allows the common
law to function as law and settle controversy, is defensible only
when judicial rules are justified as rules, and only when
judicial rules are generally followed.  Rule-following depends on
the willingness of judges and actors to apply rules even when the
results the rules prescribe conflict with their own best
judgment.  To the extent that practices we have discussed in this
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chapter are important to the quality of judicial rules, the
justification of precedent rules also depends in part on
conventional attitudes and practices of judges.  It follows that
perfect rationality can subvert the conditions for sound and
effective common law.
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